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The consumer and environmental movement that ushered in the 1970s
brought with it several unique experiments in governmental control over
business behavior. President Nixon reorganized the federal government to
create the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)' just as Congress was
enacting comprehensive amendments to the Clean Air Act,2 the Clean
Water Act,' and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act."
Congress created the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)3 to
administer new and existing statutes designed to protect children and the
general public from hazardous products. A revitalized Federal Trade
Commission began to use its latent rulemaking powers,6 and Congress
soon gave it new powers to write rules to harness industry.' Even the
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1. Reorg. Plan. No. 3 of 1970, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982), and in 84 Stat. 2086
(1970).
2. Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7642 (1982)).
3. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)).
4. Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (codi-
fied as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982)).
5. Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1982)).
6. See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 951 (1974) (FTC has authority to make substantive rules although it had previously inter-
preted its statute to deny such power).
7. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No.
93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1982)).
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Food and Drug Administration (FDA) began to experiment with proce-
dural innovations designed to enhance its regulatory efficiency.'
One of the most controversial experiments of the consumer and environ-
mental movement was the creation of the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), which Congress empowered to write health and
safety standards "reasonably necessary and appropriate" for providing
workers with a safe working environment.' Congress ordered the new
Agency within its first six months to promulgate as federal rules "national
consensus standards" written by private entities like the American
National Standards Institute (ANSI) and quasi-governmental organiza-
tions such as the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hy-
gienists (ACGIH).'0 OSHA inspectors in the field were authorized to is-
sue citations for violations both of OSHA standards and of the employers'
"general duty" to provide safe and healthful employment." An indepen-
dent three-member Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
(OSHRC) was established to adjudicate violations of OSHA standards
and the "general duty" clause. 2
The institutions created by the consumer and environmental movement
have now been in place for more than fifteen years, but it is fair to con-
clude that none of them has fully achieved the high expectations of the
consumer, environmental, and labor groups that persuaded Congress to
create them.'" OSHA, in particular, has been a disappointment. During
its seventeen-year history, the Agency has completed only twenty-four
substance-specific health regulations.' 4 Perhaps the best indication that
this output falls below what its proponents expected is that OSHA has
either no worker protection standards or inadequate standards for more
than one-half of the 110 chemicals used in workplaces that the National
Cancer Institute (NCI) regards as confirmed or suspected carcinogens. 5 A
further indication is that the ACGIH has recommended exposure limita-
8. See McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science
Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729, 761-66 (1979)
[hereinafter McGarity, Resolution of Science Policy Questions] (discussing FDA's adoption of innova-
tive summary judgment procedures); see also 21 C.F.R. § 12.93 (1988) (summary judgment
procedures).
9. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 656(b) (1982)).
10. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
11. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1982).
12. See infra notes 334-37 and accompanying text.
13. See J. CLAYBROOK, RETREAT FROM SAFETY: REAGAN'S ATTACK ON AMERICA'S HEALTH
(1984); J. LASH, K. GILLMAN & D. SHERIDAN, A SEASON OF SPoits: THE STORY OF THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION'S ATTACK ON THE ENVIRONMENT (1984).
14. See, e.g., Proposed Rule for Air Contaminants, 53 Fed. Reg. 20,960, 20,963 (1988).
15. U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, Identifying and Regulating Carcinogens, 182-84 (Nov.
1987) (on file with authors).
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tions for 300 chemicals for which OSHA either has no exposure limita-
tion regulations (approximately 200 of the chemicals) or has regulations
that are less strict than the ACGIH recommendations (approximately 100
of the chemicals).1 6 Similarly, the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH) has recommended to OSHA that it should
change existing exposure limitations or promulgate new regulations for
over 100 chemicals. 7 Moreover, there are tens of thousands of chemicals
used in workplaces (estimates range from 17,000 to 70,000) and at least
1000 new chemicals are introduced into workplaces each year. 8 Although
many, or even most, of these chemicals may not be dangerous, if even a
small proportion require regulation, OSHA has a tremendous job on its
hands.
OSHA's record, despite its limited output, should not be too quickly
denigrated. A primary lesson of the experience of agencies in the modern
regulatory context is that they face significant constraints that limit their
productivity. No health and safety agency has been able to promulgate
regulations for more than three controversial chemicals in any given
year. 9 Compounding the limitations faced by other health and safety
agencies, OSHA labors under additional constraints not faced by most of
its peers. Although OSHA has brought many of its difficulties upon itself
through poor management and an inability to set priorities, its primary
problem is the extraordinary, externally imposed constraints that it faces.
Indeed, it is in many ways surprising that OSHA has been able to regu-
late at all. To a very large extent, the OSHA reform agenda must remove
existing impediments to effective regulation.
The failure of OSHA and other health and safety agencies to make
much of a dent in their obligations to regulate suggests that the original
conception of the agencies requires rethinking. If agencies are ill-equipped
to overcome existing impediments to regulation, Congress must give them
new powers that specifically address the constraints they face. Congress
has, to some extent, recognized this lesson in environmental law and has
amended the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act to make it easier for
EPA to regulate." ° Congress' failure to realize that OSHA requires a sim-
16. Mendeloff, Regulatory Reform and OSHA Policy, 5 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 440, 442
(1986).
17. Schroeder & Shapiro, Responses to Occupational Disease: The Role of Markets, Regulations,
and Information, 72 GEO L.J. 1231, 1232 n.4 (1984).
18. Id.
19. Merrill, Federal Regulation of Cancer-Causing Chemicals, in ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 21, 113 (1982); see also Toxic Substances: EPA and OSHA
Are Reluctant Regulators, 203 SCIENCE 28 (1979) (EPA and OSHA take "years" to complete
rulemaking proceeding).
20. See infra notes 262-64 and accompanying text.
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ilar solution severely limits the Agency's ability to protect American work-
ers from crippling or fatal accidents and diseases.
This Article examines why OSHA has produced so few health and
safety regulations and what can be done to increase its output.2 Part I
explores some of the inherent difficulties that limit the number of regula-
tions promulgated by health and environmental agencies, and focuses on
some of the unique problems that plague OSHA. Part II offers some
"patch and repair" reforms that the Agency can implement internally to
solve some of its problems. Part III argues that it is time for Congress to
reopen the Occupational Safety and Health Act and offers some politically
feasible proposals for statutory change that should lead to a revitalization
of the Agency and to a more mature and effective implementation of its
policy goals.
I. OSHA's Difficult Regulatory Environment
OSHA, like other health, safety, and environmental agencies, faces
many constraints on productivity. These limitations have so adversely
affected OSHA that the realization of Congress' original plan for the
Agency has not been possible. The limitations on OSHA's productivity
are discussed first, followed by an appraisal of OSHA's attempts to pro-
mulgate regulations.
A. Constraints Affecting Regulation
The constraints on OSHA have substantive, managerial, legal, and
political dimensions. In addition, OSHA has several unique limitations
that make its job more difficult than most other regulatory agencies.
1. Substantive Constraints
An agency that is responsible for promulgating health and environmen-
tal regulations must continually make complex scientific, engineering, and
policy judgments.22 Risk assessment requires agencies to evaluate the reli-
21. The reform agenda for OSHA should also include improvement in the manner in which
OSHA enforces the standards that it promulgates. If OSHA cannot successfully enforce its regula-
tions, the promulgation of additional health and safety standards will be for naught. One of the
problems with the enforcement process, the relationship between OSHA and OSHRC, is discussed in
this Article. See infra Part III.C.2. Other problems, such as too few inspectors and a fine structure
that is unrealistic, are beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of these and related problems,
see National Safe Workplace Institute, Ending Legalized Workplace Homicide: Barriers to Job Safety
Prosecution in the U.S. (July 15, 1988) (on file with authors); Viscusi, Reforming OSHA Regulation
of Workplace Risks, in REGULATORY REFORM: WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED 234, 253-63 (1986).
22. Agency statutes typically require agencies to evaluate the risks that their standards address as
well as the feasibility of alternative vehicles for reducing those risks. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136d (1982); Consumer Product Safety Act
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ability of safety data and determine its relevance for human exposure, use,
or consumption." Yet, because of enormous scientific uncertainties stem-
ming from limitations in the available scientific data, the varying suscepti-
bility of human beings to toxic substances, and the limited understanding
of the biochemical mechanisms underlying many toxic reactions, scientific
judgment alone is incapable of resolving many of the most important
questions that arise in risk assessments.2 Consequently, difficult policy
judgments are necessary for adequate risk evaluations. 5 Placing monetary
valuations on the value of reduced risks invariably raises controversial eth-
ical questions about the appropriate dollar value to assign to a human life
and the morality of human valuation techniques. 26 Even cost and feasibil-
ity analyses are hampered by the lack of reliable cost information and the
uncertainties involved in making cost projections.27
(CPSA), 15 U.S.C. § 1262(i) (1982); Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(d)
(1982); Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 348(c) (1982) (food additives); 21 U.S.C § 355
(1982) (new drugs); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(3) (1982); Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (1982). See generally Cross, Beyond Benzene: Establishing Principles For a
Significance Threshold On Regulatable Risks of Cancer, 35 EMORY L.J. 1, 5-12 (1986). In addition,
Executive Order 12,291 independently requires executive agencies that have the authority to do so to
calculate in a quantitative way the costs and benefits of major regulations, Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3
C.F.R. § 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982); see McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and
Regulatory Reform, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1243 (1987) [hereinafter McGarity, Regulatory Analysis].
23. See Shapiro, Scientific Issues and the Function of Hearing Procedures: Evaluating the
FDA's Public Board of Inquiry, 1986 DUKE L.J. 288, 291-92 [hereinafter Shapiro, Scientific Issues].
These assessments demand scientific judgments on such matters as the statistical validity of animal
experiments and the relevance of animal tests at high doses to human exposure at low doses. Relevant
data usually consist of experiments conducted to evaluate the effect of a substance on animals and
epidemiological studies evaluating the effect of prolonged exposure to a substance. Id. at 292. See
generally NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES/NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983) [hereinafter RISK ASSESSMENT IN
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT].
24. Shapiro, Scientific Issues, supra note 23, at 294; McGarity, Resolution of Science Policy
Questions, supra note 8, at 731-49.
25. For example, when an agency chooses one risk assessment model for predicting carcinogenic
risks, it must base the choice primarily upon policy considerations. Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note
17, at 1231-37; McGarity, Media Quality, Technology, and the Utilitarian Ideal: Alternative Strate-
gies for Health and Environmental Regulation of the Chemical Industry, 46 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. Summer 1983, at 159, 185 [hereinafter McGarity, Alternative Strategies].
26. McGarity, Alternative Strategies, supra note 25, at 188-89.
27. Id. at 181. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis, supra note 22, at 1277-79. Agencies also have
difficulty evaluating the costs of secondary economic effects, such as anticompetitive and employment
effects, because of their amorphous nature. McGarity, Alternative Strategies, supra note 25, at 183;
McGarity, Regulatory Analysis, supra note 22, at 1276-89.
Although OSHA conducts risk and benefit studies, it is in a different position than other regulatory
agencies concerning the use to which these studies are put. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan,
452 U.S. 490 (1981) held that OSHA could not engage in cost-benefit analysis to determine what
level of regulation was appropriate because Congress placed the benefit of workers' health and safety
above all other considerations except whether the benefits were unachievable. Thus, OSHA is exempt
from the requirement in Exec. Order 12,291, supra note 22, that executive agencies may not promul-
gate regulations unless the benefits of those regulations exceed their costs. Cost, however, is not irrele-
vant to OSHA. All other things being equal, OSHA should choose methods of regulation that impose
the lowest possible costs. See, e.g., infra notes 212-17 and accompanying text (performance standards
that protect workers as much as design standards should be adopted because they reduce compliance
costs).
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These problems are often worse for OSHA than for other agencies
because unlike agencies with authority either to license or not to license
products, OSHA encounters regulated industries with strong economic
incentives to delay regulation. For example, because the FDA is a licens-
ing agency, it is in the regulated industry's economic interest to cooperate
with the Agency to facilitate bringing its product to market.28 By compari-
son, if OSHA orders an industry to undertake expensive changes, post-
poning implementation costs can generate considerable savings. 9 In addi-
tion, while FDA has authority to require drug manufacturers to test new
drugs in both animals and humans, 0 OSHA, because industry has an
incentive not to cooperate, must acquire the information necessary for
decisionmaking. 1
2. Managerial Constraints
Regulatory agencies always have more tasks than they have resources.
Because agencies have a relatively small number of scientists, engineers,
and economists to undertake rigorous scientific and policy analysis, only a
few chemicals or products can be considered for regulation at any one
time. 82  The growth in government spending on regulatory activities
slowed considerably in the first five years of the Reagan Administration,
and overall staffing by regulatory agencies fell by eleven percent in the
same period.8 Under these parsimonious conditions, government has had
28. interview with Ben Mintz, Professor of Law, Catholic University, in Washington, D.C.
(Sept. 25, 1986) (former head of OSHA Division, Office of Solicitor, Department of Labor) [hereinaf-
ter Mintz interview]. Of course, once a product receives a license, it is in the economic interest of the
industry to delay regulatory action, just as it is in the economic interest of OSHA regulatees to delay.
29. Interview with David Vladeck, Public Citizen, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 25, 1986) [herein-
after Vladeck interview]; Mintz interview, supra note 28; see Huber, The Old-New Risk Division in
Regulation, 69 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1035 (1983) (under licensing regulation regulatee bears risk and
cost of delay, but under standard-setting regulatee derives economic benefits from delay).
30. See McGarity & Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety Testing Informa-
tion: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837, 868-69 (1980); Shapiro, Limit-
ing Physician Freedom to Prescribe A Drug For Any Purpose: The Need for FDA Regulation, 73
Nw. U.L. REV. 801, 803 (1978) [hereinafter Shapiro, Need for FDA Regulation].
31. See infra Part III (OSHA lacks information necessary to reach decisions); see generally
Huber, supra note 29, at 1034 (licensing regulation places cost of acquiring necessary information on
regulatee, while standard setting places cost on Agency).
32. See Mendeloff, Does Overregulation Cause Underregulation? The Case of Toxic Substances,
REGULATION, Sept./Oct. 1981, at 47, 50 (shortage of personnel restricts scope of EPA and OSHA
activities and increases burdens on executive scientific staff); Levin, Politics and Polarity: The Limits
of OSHA Reform, REGULATION, Nov./Dec. 1979, at 37 (Since its inception, OSHA has been "drasti-
cally underfunded for its mission of assuring 'every working man . . . in the nation safe and healthful
working conditions.' ").
33. Wash. Post, June 4, 1984, at DII, col. 1, reprinted in R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P.
VERKUIL, ADMIN. LAW & PROCESS § 4.3.3 (1985) (citing study by The Center for the Study of
American Business, Washington University); see R. LITAN & W. NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL
REGULATION 127-28 (1983) (Reagan Administration has used "severe" budget cuts to restrain gov-
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difficulty attracting and retaining qualified staff. 4 Agencies' attempts to
compensate by creating advisory committees and hiring consultants to
carry out their regulatory missions have created problems of accountabil-
ity and coordination."5 Finally, upper-level management at regulatory
agencies turns over at a surprisingly high rate."'
While all health, safety, and environmental agencies confront these
problems, OSHA generally has less scientific expertise and more organi-
zational burdens because many of the government's occupational safety
and health scientists are located in a separate agency. Congress charged
NIOSH with researching what chemicals and substances OSHA should
regulate and making recommendations on how the Agency should be reg-
ulated. Congress' decision to house NIOSH in the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) 7 and OSHA in the Department of Labor
(DOL) 3 makes an already troublesome organizational arrangement even
more difficult. As one might imagine, this has created serious coordination
problems. Moreover, although other agencies such as the FDA and EPA
rely heavily on external advisory committees for technical expertise, 9
ernment regulation).
34. See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, REVIEW PANEL ON NEW DRUG
REGULATION, FINAL REPORT 45 (1977) [hereinafter HEW FINAL REPORT) (scientists and policy
analysts are discouraged from government work by noncompetitive salaries).
35. Shapiro, Scientific Issues, supra note 23, at 302-03.
36. The following chronology of tenure of OSHA administrators demonstrates this point:
John Pendergast May 86 - present --
Vacant July 85 - May 86 10 mos.
Robert Rowland July 84 - July 85 1 yr.
Vacant Mar. 84 - July 84 4 mos.
Thorne Auchter Mar. 81 - Mar. 84 3 yrs.
Vacant Dec. 80 - Mar. 81 3 mos.
Eula Bingham Mar. 77 - Dec. 80 3 yrs. 9 mos.
Vacant Jan. 77 - Mar. 77 3 mos.
Morton Corn Dec. 75 - Jan. 77 1 yr. I mo.
Vacant July 75 - Dec. 75 5 mos.
John Stender Apr. 73 - July 75 2 yrs. 3 mos.
Vacant Jan. 73 - Apr. 73 4 mos.
George Guenther Apr. 71 - Jan. 73 1 yr. 9 mos.
Telephone interview with Susan Fleming, Public Affairs Specialist, OSHA Office of Information and
Consumer Affairs (Dec. 12, 1988).
37. 29 U.S.C. §§ 652, 671 (1982).
38. See T. GREENWOOD, KNOWLEDGE AND DISCRETION IN GOVERNMENT REGULATION 116-18
(1984) (OSHA and NIOSH activities not well coordinated); F. THOMPSON, HEALTH POLICY AND
THE BUREAUCRACY: POLITICS AND IMPLEMENTATION 235 (1981) (joint effort by NIOSH and
OSHA to increase regulatory protection of workers ended in failure); Comptroller General of the
U.S., Delays in Setting Workplace Standards for Cancer-Causing and Other Dangerous Substances
32 (May 10, 1977) (on file with authors) (standards delayed because OSHA and NIOSH have lim-
ited teamwork, different priorities, and lack joint efforts at data collection); Telephone interview with
Grover Wrenn, President, Environ Corp. (Oct. 23, 1986) (former Director, Directorate of Health
Standards, OSHA) [hereinafter Wrenn interview] (NIOSH provides insufficient information to
OSHA to permit it to regulate).
39. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, REVIEW PANEL ON NEW DRUG
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OSHA has chosen not to appoint any rulemaking advisory committees
since 1976.40
OSHA has more organizational burdens than other agencies because of
the management structure of the DOL and of OSHA itself. OSHA's pro-
posed regulations must be reviewed by the Solicitor's Office and other
DOL officials over whom OSHA has no control. Coordination problems
with these administrators have produced numerous delays."1 OSHA's own
internal organization creates additional management burdens.' Congress
located the various professionals who must work on OSHA standards in
different departments, called Directorates, within the Agency. For exam-
ple, the Directorate of Health Standards Programs performs risk assess-
ment, the Directorate of Policy performs economic and feasibility analysis,
and the Directorate of Technical Support assists in those functions.
Because the administrators of these Directorates are coequal, no single
director has the authority to set deadlines or other management guidelines
for the others. Unless the assistant secretary directly supervises day-to-day
operations, no suitable mechanism exists to ensure accountability and to
resolve internal disputes.' 8
REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT: THE USE OF STANDING ADVISORY COMMITTEES BY THE BUREAU
OF DRUGS OF FDA 52 (1977) [hereinafter USE OF STANDING ADVISORY COMMITTEES]. EPA also
relies heavily upon its Scientific Advisory board for technical advice, and it also relies on special
advisory committees required by the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d) (1982), and the Federal
Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136w(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
40. See infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text (explanation of OSHA decision to abandon
advisory committees).
41. Interview with Frank White, Deputy Assistant Secretary, OSHA, in Washington, D.C. (Sept.
26, 1986) (hereinafter F. White interview] (coordination with offices in DOL presents problems);
Interview with Barry White, Director, Directorate of Safety Standards Programs, OSHA, in Wash-
ington, D.C. (Sept. 26, 1986) [hereinafter B. White interview] (Solicitor's Office can be "slowest link"
in OSHA decisionmaking); Interview with John Martonik, Directorate of Health Standards, OSHA,
in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 26, 1986) (hereinafter Martonik interview] (slippages in decisionmaking
caused in DOL). See generally Harter, In Search of OSHA, REGULATION, Sept./Oct. 1977, at 33, 36
(It is "at best difficult" for OSHA to act because DOL officials "adopt their own schedules and
priorities .... ).
42. Harter, supra note 41, at 34 (organizational structure at OSHA is "nightmare"); Interview
with Stevan Bokat, United States Chamber of Commerce, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 9, 1986) [here-
inafter Bokat interview].
43. Martonik interview, supra note 41 (slippage inevitable because of need to coordinate with
other units that may have own problems); Interview with Frank Frodyma, Director, Directorate of
Policy, OSHA, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 26, 1986) [hereinafter Frodyma interview] (no mechanism
exists to force a "consensus" between those persons who must participate to promulgate a standard).
This Article will not delve deeply into OSHA's organizational and management problems. For a full
discussion, see ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U. S., REPORT TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH AND OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRA-
TION: OSHA RULEMAKING PROCEDURES (written by T. McGarity & S. Shapiro) 118-99 (Feb. 19,
1987).
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3. Legal Constraints
All health and safety agencies must use some type of public process in
promulgating regulations. Although many agencies arrive at their deci-
sions through informal rulemaking," Congress has apparently required
OSHA to use hybrid rulemaking procedures for its substantive rules."
Thus, unlike agencies that only use the informal notice and comment pro-
cedures specified in section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA),"" before OSHA promulgates rules, it holds a hearing at which
interested parties can appear and cross-examine key witnesses.4 7 An even
more serious impediment is the increasingly heavy burden that reviewing
courts have placed upon agencies to justify the rules that they adopt by
reasoned analysis and by references to the rulemaking record."8 Finally,
although the APA applies an "arbitrary and capricious" standard of
review for most agencies, it requires OSHA to support its rules with
"substantial evidence." 49 As a result, the Agency may have to produce
even more convincing evidence than most other agencies before it can
regulate.5
Although all agencies are subject to judicial review, the judicial inter-
44. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (1982); Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1982).
45. The Occupational Safety and Health Act requires OSHA to hold a "public hearing" if any
interested person files written objections to a proposed rule. 29 U.S.C. § 655 (b)(3) (1982). Although
the Supreme Court has held that similar language in other statutes does not require procedures other
than those required for informal rulemaking by the Administrative Procedure Act, United States v.
Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973), OSHA has decided that Congress indicated OSHA
was to engage in additional procedures when it specified a scope of review of "substantial evidence"
for OSHA standards. B. MINTZ, OSHA: HISTORY, LAW & POLICY 61-62 (1984).
46. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
47. 29 C.F.R. § 1911 (1988).
48. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983) (agencies must have "adequate reasons" for their actions). Whether these requirements pro-
duce better decisions is the subject of a lively debate. Compare Shapiro & Levy, Heightened Scrutiny
of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency
Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387 (favoring judicial review to enforce new requirements) with Pierce,
The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469
(1985) (not favoring judicial review to enforce new requirements). Nevertheless, there can be no dis-
pute that agencies must now devote more time and resources to the hearing process than they did in
the early 1970s. The first few OSHA health standards, for example, occupied only a few pages in the
Federal Register, while recent standards have occupied hundreds of pages. Compare Standard For
Exposure to Asbestos Dust, 37 Fed. Reg. 11,318 (1972); Standard for Carcinogens, 39 Fed. Reg.
3756 (1974); Standard for Exposure to Vinyl Chloride, 39 Fed. Reg. 35,890 (1974) with Cotton Dust
Fiber Standard, 43 Fed. Reg. 27,350 (1978); Standard for Lead, 43 Fed. Reg. 52,952 (1978); Identifi-
cation, Classification and Regulation of Potential Occupational Carcinogens, 45 Fed. Reg. 5002
(1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1900.101-1990.152 (1987)) [hereinafter OSHA Generic Cancer
Policy].
49. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982) with 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1982).
50. See R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 33, § 7.3. Some argue, however, there
is little or no difference between how courts administer the two standards of review. Id. See infra
notes 256-61 and accompanying text.
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pretations of OSHA's burden of proof have particularly disadvantaged the
Agency. The APA generally places the burden of proof on the proponent
of a rule or order.5" At FDA and other licensing agencies, the proponent
is the prospective licensee, and the licensee must establish that its product
is acceptable. By comparison, OSHA is the proponent of its rules, and it
must establish that a regulation is necessary. 2 The manner in which the
courts have defined its burden of proof has also uniquely affected the
Agency. In Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Insti-
tute5 (frequently referred to as the Benzene case), the Supreme Court
held that Congress had not delegated to OSHA the authority to decide
how to proceed in the face of uncertainties about how dangerous a chemi-
cal might be. A plurality of the Court held that OSHA can promulgate a
standard only if the Agency first proves that the change is "necessary and
appropriate to remedy a significant risk of material health impairment. 5
In a later case, the entire Court confirmed that Congress required OSHA
to prove that workers face a "significant risk" before it can promulgate a
regulation limiting exposure to a chemical. 5 OSHA's obligation to prove
significant risk before it can regulate is more stringent than the burden of
proof under which other agencies, such as EPA, operate."
4. Political Constraints
One final constraint on agencies is the political nature of their work.
Regulatory decisions are normally controversial because they both affect
Congress, the White House, and various interest groups'7 and involve dif-
51. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1982).
52. Huber, supra note 29, at 1033. This allocation has three important ramifications. First, in
cases of scientific uncertainty, the same burden that tends to keep the product off the market in the
case of licensing agencies operates against OSHA regulation of similar risks. Id. at 1034. Second,
FDA can require the regulatee to develop the scientific information necessary to meet the burden.
OSHA must meet its burden with its own information. Finally, since firms regulated by OSHA
benefit from delay, OSHA enjoys less cooperation in gathering information than it would if firms
were required to obtain a license from the Agency before they could act.
53. 448 U.S. 607, 652-53 (1980) (plurality opinion) [hereinafter Benzene[.
54. For the benzene standard under review, the plurality concluded that OSHA did not have any
evidence to support a finding of "significant risk." It rejected OSHA's explanation that since no safe
level of benzene exposure could be calculated, the only prudent course was to seek the lowest exposure
level that was feasible. Id. at 631-32, 635 n.38, 639-49, 667.
55. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 505 n.25 (1981) (OSHA deter-
mined that exposure to cotton dust presented significant health hazard).
56. See infra notes 262-66 and accompanying text (Congress made it easier for EPA to regulate
by assigning Agency less demanding burden of proof).
57. See Pierce & Shapiro, Political and Judicial Review of Agency Action, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1175
(1981). Regulatory decisions redistribute wealth, often millions of dollars, from the regulated industry
to consumers or other beneficiaries. See Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF
REGULATION 358-72 (J. Wilson ed. 1980). Congress and the White House are affected because agen-
cies make choices about economic and social priorities for which elected officials are ultimately
accountable. See Pierce & Shapiro, supra, at 1195-1200, 1211-13. An agency must continually inter-
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ficult moral and philosophical choices. 58 OSHA is guaranteed an unusual
amount of political controversy5 ' because its decisionmaking process is like
a zero-sum game: any decision that significantly affects worker interests
will just as significantly affect employer interests in the opposite direction.
The long history of antagonism between those groups hampers attempts to
reconcile business and labor interests.60 Thus, OSHA has almost continu-
ally been attacked by business and its congressional allies for overregula-
tion61 and by labor, public interest groups, and other members of Con-
gress for underregulation.6" A particular area of controversy has been
OSHA's choice to implement its decisions primarily through expensive
engineering controls, such as ventilation systems, instead of much less
expensive personal protective devices, such as respirators.6" Critics argue
this choice needlessly inflates compliance costs,"" but OSHA responds that
because workers cannot be relied upon to take self-protective action, such
controls are not feasible.65 As a result of controversies like this, no signifi-
cant OSHA regulation escapes critical congressional attention,66 and in
act with these entities, and they can strongly influence the agency's ultimate success or failure. See J.
CHUBB, INTEREST GROUPS AND THE BUREAUCRACY: THE POLITICS OF ENERGY 18-57 (1983).
58. No society has sufficient resources to protect its citizens from all dangers. As a result, agencies
inevitably are faced with "tragic choices" concerning which persons will be protected and which will
not. See G. CALABRESI & P. BoBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978). These choices must be informed by
social values and they will affect the maintenance of those values. See M. DOUGLAS & A. WILDAV-
SKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
DANGERS (1982). Wide disagreement over which values should control these decisions makes them all
the more difficult. See Schroeder, Rights Against Risk, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 495 (1985).
59. Interview with Dorothy Strunk, Counsel, House Comm. on Education and Labor, in Wash-
ington, D.C. (Oct. 31, 1986) [hereinafter Strunk interview].
60. Levin, supra note 32, at 34 ("[Tihe whole bitter nature of U.S. labor history-the mutual
distrust, management's desire to run its business with minimal interference, labor's belief that employ-
ers cannot be trusted to do 'right things' without a gun at their heads-has been loaded on OSHA.");
Thompson, Deregulation by the Bureaucracy: OSHA and the Augean Quest For Error Correction,
42 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 202, 205 (1982) (conflict between business and labor particularly bitter because
each group views Agency decision as "addressing values of the most fundamental importance" and
each sees other as a "long-term enemy of many of its most basic value commitments").
61. OSHA was attacked in its early years for "Mickey Mouse standards" such as specifying split
toilet seats or forbidding ice in drinking water. Kelman, Occupational Safety and Health, in THE
POLITICS OF REGULATION 258 (J. Wilson ed. 1980). In later years, business criticism focussed on the
high compliance costs imposed by OSHA health regulations. Id. at 259; see generally Szasz, Indus-
trial Resistance to Occupational Safety and Health Legislation: 1971-1981, 32 SOCIAL PROBLEMS
104 (1984) (industry has resisted OSHA initiatives by seizing popular support for repeal of costly
regulations).
62. See, e.g., J. CLAYBROOK, supra note 13, at 110-13 (OSHA has "diligently rolled back what
health and safety protections it could on behalf of its business allies" by "backdoor administrative
ploys and evasive rhetoric."); Bargmann, OSHA: The Urgency For Revival, AFL-CIO AMERICAN
FEDERATION, June 1977 ("urgent reform" of OSHA necessary for it to reach its "full potential").
63. Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 17, at 1259.
64. See, e.g., Nichol & Zeckhauser, Government Comes to the Workplace: An Assessment of
OSHA, 49 PUB. INTEREST 39, 61-62 (1977).
65. OSHA Generic Cancer Policy, 45 Fed. Reg. 5002, 5223-24 (1980).
66. F. THOMPSON, supra note 38, at 229; Jones & Keiser, U.S. Senate Voting of Health and
Safety Regulation: The Effects of Ideology and Interest-Group Orientations, 6 HEALTH POL'Y 33
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recent years, the White House has also maintained a keen interest in
OSHA's regulatory activities."7
The intensity of this controversy has had several debilitating effects on
OSHA. First, the numerous political compromises incorporated into the
Occupational Safety and Health Act robbed OSHA of the organizational
coherence, power, and resources necessary to do an effective job. 8 Second,
because opponents have challenged almost every health decision in the
courts," OSHA often goes to extraordinary lengths to assemble a support-
ing record and to develop a supporting rationale."0 Third, in its short and
controversial history, OSHA has not yet achieved the broad-based public
acceptance, such as that experienced by older agencies like the FDA, that
legitimates individual decisions and shields decisionmakers from politically
motivated critics.7 ' Finally, because business and labor fear the outcome of
an all-out political battle in Congress over amendments to the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act, both have vigorously blocked consideration
of legislative reforms that might facilitate OSHA rulemaking.7 2
(1986); see Levin, supra note 32, at 33 (from 1973-76 Congress held over one hundred oversight
hearings concerning OSHA).
67. F. THOMPSON, supra note 38, at 225-26. Some have claimed that health regulations have
been a particular target of the Reagan Administration White House staff. See, e.g., HousE SUB-
COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, OMB
REVIEW OF CDC RESEARCH: IMPACT OF THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT, H. REP. No.
99-MM, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (OMB has discriminated against collection of data for environ-
mental and health regulations); Morrison, OMB Interference With Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong
Way to Write Regulations, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1059 (1986).
68. See Levin, supra note 32, at 36-37; Telephone interview with Sy Holtzman, Deputy Staff
Director, Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Education and Labor (Oct. 21, 1986) [herein-
after Holtzman interview]. Examples of such compromises include the decision to put NIOSH in a
separate department, see infra note 323 and accompanying text, the use of the "substantial evidence"
test for judicial review, see supra note 49 and accompanying text, and the creation of OSHRC to
adjudicate the merits of OSHA citations of employers for violation of OSHA standards and the gen-
eral duty clause, see infra notes 335-36 and accompanying text.
69. Business has sought review for all but four of OSHA's first eighteen health standards. See
Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 17, at 1305-09. Moreover, labor and public interest groups have
continually sued OSHA for failure to issue regulations. See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text;
Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 17, at 1263.
70. Moreover, in the late 1970s all OSHA decisionmaking was brought to a halt while OSHA
awaited the outcome of a series of important court cases. Viscusi, The Status of OSHA Reform: A
Comment on Mendeloffs Proposals, 5 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 469, 471 (1986).
71. See Levin, supra note 32, at 39 (public's commitment "to job safety and health does not run
deep or wide enough to make the subject a top national priority"); Harter, supra note 41, at 34
(OSHA has little political support). By comparison, agencies like FDA enjoy broad popular support
because they resolved years ago the type of intense political problems that currently plague OSHA.
Telephone interview with Donald McLearn, Special Asst. to the Director, Bureau of Drugs, FDA
(Oct. 16, 1986).
72. Strunk interview, supra note 59 (no constituency for legislative reform because both labor and
industry perceive they would be worse off); Holtzman interview, supra note 68 (OSHA supporters
afraid that if new legislation were to be considered Agency would be substantially weakened).
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B. Effects on OSHA's Productivity
The above constraints have taken such a toll on OSHA that the Agency
has not realized Congress' original plan. Congress recognized that it had
assigned OSHA an overwhelming responsibility when it required OSHA
to regulate every chemical that poses a significant health hazard and, to
the extent feasible, to make every workplace safe."3 Congress authorized
the Agency to adopt and enforce voluntary, "consensus" industry health
and safety codes, including some 400 exposure ceilings for toxic substances
set by the ACGIH. 4 Congress intended that OSHA would update the
consensus standards as it received recommendations from NIOSH; 5 in
the meantime, these standards would protect workers." Although these
"consensus standards" are now hopelessly out of date,77 the previously
discussed constraints have prevented OSHA from updating or supple-
menting them. OSHA admits that its regulation of health hazards is so
inadequate that "millions of employees in total are exposed to levels of...
chemicals which the literature or expert opinion indicates do or may cre-
ate deleterious health effects."78
The amount of time necessary for OSHA to adopt a regulation is indic-
ative of the extent of the difficulties it has when it attempts to update and
supplement its consensus standards. The combination of agency and judi-
cial delay has often been extreme. Each of OSHA's first twelve health
standards took an average of four years and two months to adopt,"' and
judicial review delayed their implementation by an average of two more
years. " Five important standards between 1971 and 1984 took six to eight
73. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1982).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1982); see Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 17, at 1257; Hamilton, The
Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting
Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1388-91 (1978) (description of OSHA adoption of consen-
sus standards).
75. S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5177, 5182.
76. Interview with Robert Gombar, Venable, Baetjer, Howard & Civiletti, in Washington, D.C.
(Oct. 30, 1986) [hereinafter Gombar interview] (Congress erroneously expected that OSHA could
quickly adopt new standards).
77. OSHA does not have standards for most of the carcinogens found in workplaces, see supra
note 15 and accompanying text. Similar discrepancies exist for safety standards. For example, al-
though the consensus standards contain no encompassing regulation for disabling all types of machines
to protect employees when service or maintenance activities are performed, see Control of Hazardous
Energy Sources (Lockout/Tagout), Proposed Rule, 53 Fed. Reg. 15,496 (1988), OSHA has not yet
adopted such a general standard.
78. Proposed Rule for Air Contaminants 53 Fed. Reg. 20,960, 20,962 (1988) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 1910) (proposed Apr. 29, 1988).
79. Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 17, at 1305-09. Two standards (coke oven emissions and
lead) took more than six years; three standards (inorganic arsenic, cotton fiber, and cotton gin dust)
took three to four years; two standards (asbestos and fourteen carcinogens) took two to three years;
and the other five standards took less than two years.
80. Id. at 1258.
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and one-half years from the time OSHA commenced work until the com-
pletion of judicial review. 1 Since 1984, OSHA's pace has not quickened.
For example, OSHA finally promulgated a standard for benzene in 1987,
nearly seven years after the Supreme Court struck down the previous
standard.82 Similar delays have occurred for safety standards. For exam-
ple, in 1977, OSHA first considered a standard for locking out or disa-
bling all machines or equipment to protect workers during maintenance or
service activities," but the Agency has yet to adopt a final standard.8 '
II. Patch and Repair Solutions
OSHA clearly cannot continue to operate as it has in the past. Given a
four to eight year gestation period and other resource constraints,85 OSHA
has the capacity to undertake only two to five new projects in any single
year. To avoid falling even further behind, absent statutory change,
OSHA must optimize the use of its limited resources.
If OSHA is to increase its ability to regulate, it must take three steps.
First, it must adopt a system of setting priorities among the various
problems it needs to address. Although how OSHA chooses new projects
among the thousands of conditions that create potentially hazardous work-
places is a matter of no small importance to the Agency, the regulated
industries, and workers, OSHA at the moment has no discernable system
for setting priorities.86 Second, it must adopt different regulatory
approaches that offer more protection for workers. If OSHA can promul-
gate only a few regulations each year, it should choose methods of regula-
tion that maximize the extent to which workers will be protected. Yet
81. Id.
82. The previous standard was struck down in the Benzene decision, 448 U.S. 607, 652-53
(1980). For the OSHA standard, see Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 52 Fed. Reg. 34,460 (1987)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910) (proposed Sept. 11, 1987).
83. See Machinery and Machine Guarding, Request for Information on Technical Issues and
Notice of Public Meetings, 42 Fed. Reg. 1741 (1977) (to he codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910) (proposed
Jan. 7, 1977).
84. OSHA finally proposed a standard in 1988. See Control of Hazardous Energy Sources (Lock-
out/Tagout), Proposed Rule, 53 Fed. Reg. 15,496 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910)
(proposed Jan. 7, 1988).
85. OSHA has sufficient resources to pursue actively only about 15 to 20 rulemaking efforts at
any given moment. The Health Standards Directorate has approximately 33 professionals to devote to
rulemaking activities. Martonik interview, supra note 41. That Directorate is currently working on
about seventeen to eighteen projects, but many of these are small and some are winding down. The
Safety Standards Directorate has approximately 20 professionals. B. White interview, supra note 41.
One long-time health scientist in the Health Standards Directorate estimates that at current staffing
levels, OSHA is only capable of working effectively on six or seven standards at any one time. Tele-
phone interview with Edward Stein, Directorate of Health Standards Programs, OSHA (Oct. 21,
1986) [hereinafter Stein interview]. A member of the Policy Directorate put the number at nine to ten
health standards. Telephone Interview with Larry Braslow, Supervising Economist, Directorate of
Policy, OSHA (Oct. 24, 1986) [hereinafter Braslow interview].
86. See infra notes 88-102 and accompanying text.
Vol. 6: 1, 1989
Reorienting OSHA
OSHA currently has no methodology to identify and seek out such alter-
native methods of regulation.8" Finally, OSHA must consider how it can
increase the efficiency of its decisionmaking process. The next section con-
siders how OSHA can implement these patch and repair solutions.
OSHA can begin its search for reforms capable of speeding up its
standard-setting pace by examining mechanisms already at its disposal.
While the Occupational Safety and Health Act is more constraining than
some of the other modern rulemaking statutes, it still gives OSHA a fair
degree of flexibility in adopting standard-setting techniques. Furthermore,
unlike some of the modern standard-setting agencies, OSHA has a great
deal of discretion to set its own priorities, a discretion that has languished
unused in the past.
A. Establish Priorities at OSHA
Many different groups exert influence on the formation of OSHA pri-
orities. The conflicting forces produced by these groups establish a need
for a formal priority-setting process. OSHA has several different alterna-
tive priority-setting schemes from which it may choose.
1. Current Sources of OSHA's Priorities
OSHA compiles its regulatory agenda in reaction to interest group de-
mands, congressional and White House pressure, and information from its
employees and other regulatory agencies. As might be expected, these
sources require more of OSHA than it has resources to provide. Without
a coherent priority-setting process, OSHA has no means of choosing
among the many available projects.
The most frequent source of OSHA rulemaking initiatives during the
last five years has been petitions from unions and public interest groups
backed by the threat of a "bureaucracy forcing" lawsuit.88 Unions or pub-
lic interest groups typically petition OSHA to write rules on topics that
are the subject of recent scientific studies or media attention. Beneficiary
groups and many OSHA officials firmly believe that but for the threat of
a lawsuit, OSHA would never decide to take up difficult and controversial
projects.8" Some Agency officials are content to let beneficiaries play a
very large role in setting the Agency's agenda. Yet, it is inappropriate for
87. See infra notes 136-76 and accompanying text.
88. A "bureaucracy forcing" lawsuit is one in which a regulatory beneficiary sues an agency to
"compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed." 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1982).
89. Telephone interview with Margaret Seminario, Assistant Director, Department of Occupa-
tional Safety, Health, and Social Security, AFL-CIO (Nov. 4, 1986) [hereinafter Seminario
interview].
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beneficiary groups to dominate OSHA's agenda-setting process. No indi-
vidual petitioner is likely to have the expertise or the inclination to assess
comparative risks across a broad spectrum of occupations to determine
which workers are most in need of protection. Indeed, relying exclusively
on petitions to set agency priorities would probably force the Agency to
give less attention to the working conditions of unorganized workers.9"
Congressional pressure also influences OSHA. While input from
elected representatives is a necessary and proper element of setting priori-
ties, it sometimes deteriorates into wasteful partisan posturing. Although
most knowledgeable members of Congress know that scientific rulemaking
is an arduous process that should not be undertaken lightly, the opportu-
nity to score easy political points at the Agency's expense sometimes
proves irresistible. Congress also lacks sufficient technical expertise to di-
vine which rulemaking topics should take precedence over others. More
than most institutions, Congress is susceptible to the "chemical-of-the-
month syndrome,"91 under which the Agency is forced to undertake in-
tense scrutiny of new topics on an ad hoc basis as new evidence reaches
the media. The Agency may find itself chasing after high-visibility, low-
risk subjects, while low-visibility, high-risk topics go unaddressed.92
White House and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) pressure
is another source of OSHA priorities. Like Congress, the White House is
sensitive to political constituencies, and like congressional pressure, presi-
dential pressure can be highly motivating. 3 Presidential pressure has
many of the same advantages and disadvantages of congressional pressure.
90. Telephone interview with Dr. Imogene E. Sevin, Directorate of Health Standards Programs,
OSHA (Nov. 3, 1986) [hereinafter Sevin interview]; Telephone Interview with George Henschel,
Department of Labor, Office of Solicitor (Oct. 28, 1986) [hereinafter Henschel interview]. A recent
increase in the frequency of petitions suggests that OSHA must act quickly to protect its limited
rulemaking resources. The experience of the CPSC under a now-defunct provision of the Consumer
Product Safety Act suggests that inundation is a very real possibility. Consumer Product Safety Act §
10(e), 15 U.S.C. § 2059(e) (repealed 1981), required the CPSC to respond to petitions within 120
days. Failure to respond could result in a "bureaucracy-forcing lawsuit" in federal district court in
which the question whether the product's risks crossed the statutory threshold was tried de novo. In its
first three years, CPSC was inundated with two hundred petitions. Schwartz, The Consumer Product
Safety Commission: A Flawed Product of the Consumer Decade, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 32, 47
(1982).
91. E.g., Steelworkers Seek Emergency Standard for High Hazard Chemical Plants, 888 Empl.
Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 2-3 (May 17, 1988) (OMB objected to OSHA decision to investigate
high hazard chemical plants following Bhopal disaster because there was little evidence that U.S.
plants were dangerous).
92. Vladeck interview, supra note 29.
93. F. White interview, supra note 41 (OMB pressured OSHA to eliminate burdensome record-
keeping requirement in brief twelve-month period); Telephone interview with Mike Wright, Director
of Safety and Health, United Steelworkers (Oct. 24, 1986) (OMB pressured OSHA not to formalize
standard to address Bhopal-like chemical leaks).
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One significant difference, however, is that White House and OMB pres-
sure has been considerably less visible than congressional pressure.94
Other agencies and OSHA's own employees bring data to OSHA's
attention, influencing its regulatory agenda. NIOSH publishes "criteria
documents" which contain analyses of existing information on workplace
hazards and recommendations for addressing those hazards.95 EPA refers
chemicals to OSHA for regulation under the provisions of the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act.9" OSHA also considers information from its inspec-
tors97 and developments in other states and foreign countries.98 Yet,
OSHA has found NIOSH data to be inadequate for its purposes;99 in any
case, OSHA cannot cede its priority-setting power to an agency in an
entirely separate department of government.100 A similar problem exists
concerning EPA referrals.' 01 Finally, information from OSHA inspectors
94. While members of Congress score political points through high visibility investigations, the
White House can score political points through quiet intervention into ongoing rulemaking activities.
Moreover, there is some reason to believe that OMB and White House pressure originates outside of
the government. For example, the Vice President's Task Force's "hit list" was largely based on sug-
gestions from the regulated industries. See, e.g., Houck, President X and the New (Approved) Deci-
sionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1987); HOUSE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS,
99TH CONG., 2D SESS., OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET INFLUENCE ON AGENCY REGULA-
TIONS (Comm. Print 1986).
95. Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 17, at 1257.
96. EPA may refer chemicals to another agency for regulation if there is a reasonable basis to
conclude that a chemical will present an unreasonable risk and if EPA determines that "such risk
may be prevented or reduced to a sufficient extent by action" taken by another ajency. 15 U.S.C.
§ 2608 (1982).
97. OSHA has a large cadre of inspectors who are continually observing and monitoring work-
places on a daily basis. Frodyma interview, supra note 43. Their efforts produce large amounts of
information about safety hazards and the levels of some hazardous substances, B. White interview,
supra note 41, which can be used to set priorities. Henschel interview, supra note 90.
98. Telephone interview with Arthur Gas, Industrial Hygienist, Directorate of Health Standards
Programs, OSHA (Oct. 30, 1986) [hereinafter Gas interview].
99. See infra notes 323-32 and accompanying text (OSHA and NIOSH have significant coordi-
nation problems); Peterson, OSHA May Drop Standard-Setting Efforts, Wash. Post, Sept. 21, 1983,
at A2, col. 3 (OSHA staff recommended Agency stop working on NIOSH criteria documents for 115
substances).
100. Clearly, governmental resources would best be utilized if NIOSH and OSHA could coordi-
nate their efforts to address the prioritization problem. Past efforts at coordination, however, have
failed, see Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 17, at 1256-1257 (NIOSH and OSHA standards comple-
tion project aimed at coordinating two agencies ended in failure). Better coordination may not be
possible unless NIOSH is moved to the DOL, see infra notes 329-30 and accompanying text (arguing
that NIOSH should be moved to DOL to ensure coordination with OSHA).
101. Since EPA is in no better position than OSHA to determine workplace exposures, EPA can
refer to OSHA chemicals that may pose relatively trivial workplace risks. Seminario interview, supra
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is usually too poorly organized to be a basis for setting priorities. 1 2
2. The Need For a Formal Priority-Setting Process
OSHA must respond to all of these internal and external demands for
regulation, but it has no formal means of doing so. OSHA's one attempt
to rank priorities systematically was its 1979 carcinogen policy, which
contained a scheme for ranking substances that showed indications of car-
cinogenicity.' 0 OSHA screened about 200 substances and attempted to
rank them according to exposure, quality of data, and potency.10' This
effort was intensely controversial, and OSHA ultimately abandoned it
after the Benzene"'0 decision cast doubt on its validity. The vehemence
with which employers rejected this first attempt by OSHA to set a priori-
ties list has made the Agency chary of public priority-setting, and in the
intervening years it has not attempted any similar projects.
Although some participants and observers of the OSHA rulemaking
process maintain that the petition process is sufficient to force OSHA
toward regulating the most hazardous workplaces,'0 6 most agree that
OSHA should set its own priorities."7 While few would argue that past
rulemaking petitions have addressed trivial risks, only OSHA is in a posi-
tion to determine whether a particular rulemaking initiative represents the
best use of the Agency's severely limited resources.' 0 8 However, despite
several half-hearted internal attempts to establish an explicit priority-
note 89; Martonik interview, supra note 41. Moreover, EPA may use a referral to OSHA as a
convenient device for avoiding difficult regulatory questions, and there is some evidence that OMB has
sought referrals to OSHA to avoid some of the more stringent regulatory tools available to EPA.
Hearings Before Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, EPA's Asbestos Regulations: Report on a Case Study of OMB Interference, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1985); Interview with Debra Jacobson, Counsel, Subcomm. on Investigations of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 16, 1986).
102. Frodyma interview, supra note 43; Sevin interview, supra note 90.
103. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1990 (1987).
104. Telephone interview with Charles Gordon, Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor
(Oct. 23, 1986) [hereinafter Gordon interview]; Stein interview, supra note 85.
105. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
106. E.g., Frodyma interview, supra note 43; Martonik interview, supra note 41; Telephone
interview with Neil King, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering (Oct. 28, 1986) [hereinafter King interview].
107. Interviews with academics, labor union officials, business officials, and OSHA employees
revealed virtual unanimity on the proposition that OSHA should have some process for establishing
its own priorities. Seminario interview, supra note 89; Sevin interview, supra note 90. Telephone
interview with Arthur Sampson, Kirkland & Ellis (Oct. 24, 1986) [hereinafter Sampson interview].
108. Seminario interview, supra note 89; Sevin interview, supra note 90.
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setting scheme,'" 9 virtually all observers of the process agree that OSHA
currently lacks even a rudimentary priority-setting process." 0
An explicit priority-setting mechanism would be useful to OSHA in its
internal management. Without a list of priorities, members of the Agency
staff can never be certain that a superior will not call them away in the
midst of a project to begin a new project with a higher priority."' Like-
wise, OSHA can coordinate-with contractors and other agencies so that
up-to-date information is available to Agency decisionmakers at the time
that they will find it most useful." 2
There are, however, significant practical obstacles to adopting a formal
priority-setting process. First, the Agency must devise a rational scheme
for ranking priorities. Although an ideal priority-setting scheme would
stress risks to workers (including considerations of toxicity and extent of
exposure) and would perhaps pay some attention to the practicality of
controls, there is rarely enough high-quality information available to
make quantitative comparisons. Second, an explicit priority-setting process
might destroy OSHA's carefully nurtured mystique that everything that
comes before it has a high priority."' Third, there could be difficulty in
109. Stein interview, supra note 85; Telephone interview with Robert Beliles, Senior Scientist,
Carcinogen Assessment Group, EPA (Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter Beliles interview]; Telephone inter-
view with Susan Harwood, Office of Risk Assessment, OSHA (Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter Harwood
interview].
110. Wrenn interview, supra note 38; Braslow interview, supra note 85; Seminario interview,
supra note 89; Sevin interview, supra note 90; Sampson interview, supra note 107. An appropriate
metaphor for the current OSHA standard-setting process is that of a business establishment with a
front door, a side window, and a back door. The owner expects most business to come through the
front door, but it reserves the back door for dealing with complaints about previous transactions.
Impatient customers come in through the side window and thereby avoid the crowd pressing at the
front door. In the context of OSHA, petitions, information from the field, and recommendations for
exposure limitations from private standard-setting groups, such as the ACGIH and the ANSI, are all
pressing at the front door. OMB and the White House are pushing some previously promulgated
rules in through the back door, and Congress and the courts are pushing some rulemaking petitions
and other hot topics through the side window. At present, the press of business for OSHA's reduced
staff from the back door and side window is so great that it cannot accept any business through the
front door. Instead of an orderly queue at the front door, there is a great crowd of potential topics. At
frequent intervals an interest group becomes impatient with waiting in line and moves over to the side
window. The time is near when there will also be a disorderly crowd at the side window. OSHA long
ago lost control over its front-door agenda; it now risks total paralysis as its limited capacity to pro-
duce rules becomes overwhelmed by the press at the side window. OSHA's inability to set its own
priorities also affects the regulated industry's ability to make future investment decisions. Industry
representatives complain of the "halting process of regulation" that results from OSHA's failure to
establish definite priorities. Sampson interview, supra note 107; Interview with Scott Railton, Reed,
Smith, Shaw & McClay, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 30, 1986) [hereinafter Railton interview]. An
explicit and open priority-setting procedure would not only allow OSHA to regain some degree of
control over its own agenda, but it would also make regulatees and beneficiary groups aware of
OSHA's plans for the future.
111. Sevin interview, supra note 90; Stein interview, supra note 85; Braslow interview, supra
note 85.
112. Stein interview, supra note 85.
113. F. White interview, supra note 41; Frodyma interview, supra note 43.
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designing a priority-setting mechanism with sufficient flexibility to enable
OSHA to place a high-priority project on hold when the subject industry
suffered an economic recession."' Finally, to the extent that the priori-
tization scheme results in a public list or agenda, the Agency can expect
resistance from those with an economic interest in the hazards that wind
up on the list.
Despite these disadvantages, there is a broad consensus that OSHA
must assume control over its own rulemaking agenda. 5 OSHA should
immediately establish a process for determining an explicit list of Agency
priorities to which it will presumptively adhere in undertaking future
rulemaking initiatives.
3. Alternative Priority Schemes
Although priority setting is never easy, other agencies appear to have
achieved a greater degree of control over their own agenda than OSHA.
Several broad priority-setting models are available, including ad hoc man-
agement choices, quantitative risk assessment, numerical scoring devices,
and systematic selection by committee." 6
Under an ad hoc arrangement, management reacts to all potential
sources of agency priorities in an unbounded fashion. For example,
upper-level management may periodically gather with staffers and mid-
level management to brainstorm about agency priorities-especially when
the agency must prepare its submission for the President's Regulatory
Agenda.1 7 Agency managers find ad hoc arrangements attractive for the
following reasons: they avoid expensive data gathering; they increase flexi-
bility; they sidestep difficult political questions; and they do not require
detailed explanation about the Agency's priorities." 8 These advantages,
however, are also disadvantages. Ad hoc arrangements, because they are
114. Frodyma interview, supra note 43. Likewise, explicit priorities reduce the extent to which
the Agency can place a high priority on uncontroversial projects that will not necessarily produce
large health and safety benefits but that will yield attractive statistics. For example, the Agency can
give the appearance of high productivity by simply promulgating a large number of standards that
entail very few compliance costs because they entail very few safety enhancing changes. Interview
with Daniel Jacoby, Department of Labor, Office of Solicitor, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 26, 1986)
[hereinafter Jacoby interview].
115. See, e.g., Federal Regulation of Cancer-Causing Chemicals (Recommendation No. 82-5), 1
C.F.R. § 305.82-5 (1986); Priority Setting and Management of Rulemaking by the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (Recommendation No. 87-1), 1 C.F.R. § 305.87-1 (1988).
116. This analysis of the various types of priority-setting schemes is based in large measure on the
observations of Dr. Imogene Sevin, an OSHA health scientist. Sevin interview, supra note 90.
117. Id. In addition, staff members receive subtle signals from superiors about the amount of
attention that should be devoted to various topics, and these signals change periodically as the topic
heats up or cools off in the political atmosphere in which management operates. Frodyma interview,
supra note 43.
118. Sevin interview, supra note 90.
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more political, less scientific, and less structured than other priority-
setting systems, are likely to do an inadequate job of ranking hazards
according to their relative risks." 9 In addition, these arrangements can
cause confusion among Agency staff concerning how to allocate time,
breed inconsistency during Agency transition, and ultimately waste
Agency resources.
At the opposite extreme from ad hoc arrangements is the quantitative
listing approach. The most technically precise quantitative listing
approaches require an agency to rank substances according to their rela-
tive risk based on detailed information concerning the toxicity of various
compounds and the extent of worker exposure. A somewhat less rigorous,
but still highly quantitative tool is the mega-scoring device, in which
agency officials attach quantitative scores to identifiable aspects of poten-
tially hazardous workplace conditions based on their qualitative evalua-
tion of the existing data. They then rank substances according to these
scores. O Mega-scoring devices have the advantage of using information
that is more readily available than the information necessary for the
quantitative listing approach. 121 Use of both approaches is limited by a
lack of available data,'22 by the unsettled state of the art of risk assess-
ment, ' 2  and by their failure to accommodate the political needs of agency
leadership.
119. For example, there is fairly broad agreement within the Agency that an oil and gas industry
safety standard would provide very large safety benefits, but political considerations have essentially
eliminated that topic from the Agency's agenda. Conversely, the political furor that erupted over the
discovery of ethylene dibromide in citrus and food grains sent OSHA scurrying to promulgate an
EDB standard that will protect only a relatively few workers from a substance that is almost certainly
doomed to extinction in the near future. Vladeck interview, supra note 29.
120. See Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., The Role of Risk Assessment in Setting Federal Regu-
latory Priorities, Report Prepared for the Chemical Manufacturers' Ass'n. (1984) [hereinafter Peat,
Marwick Report] (on file with authors). Given accurate risk assessments, this method ensures that the
Agency is addressing the worst risks first. Harwood interview, supra note 109. See generally U.S.
National Institute of Occupational Safety & Health, A Model for the Identification of High Risk
Occupational Groups Using RTECS and NOHS Data (Oct. 1983) (describing computer program for
combining risk data from Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances with exposure information
from National Occupational Hazard Survey).
121. For example, production quantities may be used as a rough surrogate for actual worker
exposure. A mega-scoring approach is also less resource intensive, can be adjusted to reflect the degree
of confidence of the Agency in the available data, and can incorporate administrative, economic, and
technological feasibility considerations into the ranking scheme.
122. See Seminario interview, supra note 89 (OSHA sometimes lacks even rudimentary toxicolog-
ical data on chemicals and usually lacks accurate information for toxic chemicals). Mega-scoring
devices are also unreliable because they are based on surrogates for real data and rely heavily upon
subjective considerations. Sevin interview, supra note 90.
123. Risk assessment tools are only available for a very few health effects, such as carcinogenesis.
Sevin interview, supra note 90; Stein interview, supra note 85; Beliles interview, supra note 109.
Even those quantitative tools that are available are always controversial, Stein interview, supra note
85. See generally Comment, The Significant Risk Requirement in OSHA Regulation of Carcinogens:
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 33 STAN. L. REV. 551,
564 n. 68 (1981).
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Many agencies use a process that can incorporate both of the previous
approaches.12' The committee approach preserves much of the flexibility
of the ad hoc approach, while at the same time building technical exper-
tise into the priority-setting process by including persons who have techni-
cal expertise and who are sensitive to political considerations. Committees
can use the results of risk assessment or mega-scoring exercises, 25 but
they also can adjust agency priorities on the basis of new information, new
assessments of old information, judicially imposed deadlines, and changed
political circumstances. While the committee approach deprives upper-
level management of some of its control over the agency's agenda, granting
managers membership on the committee can overcome this disadvantage
somewhat.126
4. Establishing A Committee Approach
An internal committee is the most promising approach for OSHA.'27
OSHA should establish a permanent priority-setting committee charged
with both-drafting an initial ranked list of Agency priorities for regulation
and meeting on a continuing and periodic basis to reexamine the list
either to add or to subtract items.' 28 To guarantee both technical expertise
and political sensitivity, membership of the committee should consist of
highly regarded health professionals from OSHA's technical staff and
management staffers, including at least one of OSHA's deputy assistant
secretaries.' 29 To preserve badly needed continuity, committee member-
124. For example, in 1976 Congress established an Interagency Testing Committee to set priori-
ties for testing chemicals under the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (1982). NIOSH
is currently adopting a committee approach toward setting its own priorities. Sevin interview, supra
note 90.
125. See Telephone interview with Dale Ruhter, Branch Chief, Economic Analysis Branch,
Waste Management and Economics Division, Office of Solid Waste, EPA (Nov. 20, 1986) [hereinaf-
ter Ruhter interview].
126. Other disadvantages of the committee approach are the problems that afflict any group deci-
sionmaking device. For example, committees can become afflicted with the vision-narrowing disease
referred to in the public policy literature as "groupthink." The committee must have a chairman who
is willing to bring matters to closure. Since the committee would be more in the nature of a decision-
making entity than a study committee, it would have to decide how it would address the absence of
consensus and whether dissenting opinions would be allowed or encouraged.
127. OSHA should reject the temptation, to which other agencies have succumbed, to employ an
outside committee of experts appointed by the National Research Council of the National Academy of
Sciences (NAS). See generally C. Grobstein, The Role of the National Academy of Sciences in Public
Policy and Regulatory Decisionmaking, in LAW AND SCIENCE IN COLLABORATION 115 (1983). Since
its policy-laden decisions cannot be made on a purely scientific or technical basis, OSHA should not
cede control over and responsibility for its priorities to the NAS.
128. OSHA must have some method to process important policy considerations which require
rapid treatment. Sampson interview, supra note 107; Seminario interview, supra note 89.
129. To ensure coordination with other agencies, the committee could also include nonvoting rep-
resentatives from NIOSH, the National Toxicology Program (NTP), and EPA. Congress clearly
meant for NIOSH to play a role in OSHA priority-setting. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(g) (1982). The NTP
is a multi-agency chemical testing program housed in the HHS, which tests chemicals for OSHA and
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ship should not turn over any more rapidly than once every three years,
and committee members should be eligible for reappointment. Finally, to
promote candid interchange, the meetings should be closed to the public,
but OSHA should make public the results of the meetings after the assis-
tant secretary has had an opportunity to adopt or overrule the committee
recommendations.
OSHA can expect significant resistance to any explicit priority list from
regulated industries13° and beneficiary groups. 3 The Agency can limit
this opposition by taking two steps. First, the priority-setting committee
could hold one or more workshops during which all of the relevant inter-
est groups would attempt to agree on a consensus list of priorities.1"2 Sec-
ond, OSHA could avoid some opposition by grading chemicals or other
hazards, rather than ranking them in numerical order. For example,
rather than ranking fifty potentially hazardous chemicals on a scale of one
to fifty, the committee could divide the fifty into ten "top priority" chemi-
cals, ten additional "very high priority" chemicals, and so forth.
Because outside parties may have information that could be important
to the Agency's ranking decisions, the committee should invite public com-
ment on its work and be open to changing its ranking in light of the
comments. The Agency should take the position that its priority lists are
merely internal aids to setting an agenda and are not themselves rules
subject to notice and comment procedures133 and judicial review.1 3' If the
other agencies. Both the NTP and EPA have the capability of generating new information on suspect
chemicals, a capacity that OSHA lacks. Seminario interview, supra note 89.
130. No company is happy to see a hazard that it deals with labeled a "bad actor," even if OSHA
action never flows from that determination. Interview with Karl Kronenbush, Office of Technology
Assessment, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 31, 1988) [hereinafter Kronenbush interview]. For example,
an OSHA priority list might trigger product liability suits. Once a chemical finds its way onto an
OSHA "hit list," workers and others who are exposed to the substance become aware that it has
harmful effects, and they may be inclined to attribute particular afflictions to their exposure to the
chemical. King interview, supra note 106.
131. Opposition is inevitable from labor unions and other beneficiaries that believe that hazards
relevant to their interests are too low on the priority list.
132. For example, NIOSH recently held a national strategy workshop to help that agency set its
top ten priorities. Seminario interview, supra note 89.
133. Rulemaking is unnecessary because placing a chemical or hazard on the list in no way obli-
gates the Agency to take regulatory action. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1982) (APA requirements of
notice and comment do not apply to "general statements of policy"). The Administrative Conference
has recommended that agencies consider rulemaking procedures for priority-setting systems, but more
informal methods are appropriate for ranking individual chemicals for evaluation and regulation. See
Federal Regulation of Cancer-Causing Chemicals (Recommendation No. 82-5), 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-5
(1988).
134. A challenge to the list would not be ripe for review until the list is applied in an individual
case to initiate a rulemaking action, in which case judicial review would only be appropriate at the
end of the rulemaking activity. Texas v. Department of Energy, 764 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1985) (desig-
nation of two sites as potentially acceptable sites for nuclear waste repository not ripe for judicial
review); see Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-52 (1967) (rule may be ripe for
review at completion of rulemaking process). See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREA-
TISE § 25.6 (1983). Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1985), which allowed a
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evolving list were subject to judicial review upon initial promulgation or
upon amendment, then the attendant delays could defeat the purpose of
the exercise.' 85
B. Adopt Different Approaches To Regulation That Maximize Worker
Protection
If OSHA adopts a priority-setting process, it will be able to use its
resources to protect workers from the most serious of those hazards that
are not regulated, or are not adequately regulated, by the consensus stan-
dards. This step, however, is not enough. Even a well-functioning
priority-setting system cannot greatly increase the number of hazards that
OSHA can regulate. If OSHA can only adopt a few regulations each
year, it must focus on regulations that maximize the protection available
to workers.
Two additional temporary solutions are currently within OSHA's
power. First, the Agency should update its consensus standards to provide
a minimum floor of protection while it considers whether more stringent
regulations are appropriate. Second, whenever possible it should use ge-
neric regulations that cover multiple hazards.
1. Update Consensus Health Standards
OSHA has not changed most of its health standards since it adopted
them in 1971 when the Agency was founded, and as a result, millions of
workers are exposed to chemicals considered to be dangerous.' OSHA
therefore has decided to update its consensus standards by replacing the
existing primary exposure limitations (PELs) with new limitations recom-
mended by the ACGIH and NIOSH.' 7 Under its new rule, the Agency
challenge to EPA's hazard ranking system for waste sites under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9657 (1982), can
be distinguished. CERCLA required EPA to promulgate the list, it specified criteria for creating the
list, and it authorized judicial review of it. Eagle-Picher, 759 F.2d at 909-10, 916. None of those
conditions apply to OSHA's situation. Moreover, the relative position of a particular hazard is not
appropriate for judicial review because, like a decision whether to prosecute, the ranking of a hazard
is based on a combination of technical and policy considerations for which there is little statutory
guidance. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (Agency decision not to prosecute is not judi-
cially reviewable in absence of clear statutory guidelines for decision).
135. If the list were subject to judicial review, however, it is highly unlikely that a court would
overturn a reasonable scheme, even if OSHA could not support it with hard data and analysis. See
Eagle-Picher, 759 F.2d at 921-22 (court gave considerable deference to EPA's ranking of hazardous
waste sites).
136. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
137. OSHA recently initiated a generic rulemaking process to update the PELs. Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, 53 Fed. Reg. 20,960 (1988). OSHA has attempted to avoid some of the problems
with the generic approach by undertaking an independent evaluation of the ACGIH standards.
OSHA has thoroughly examined all of the substances for which it proposes to update PELs, has
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established new PELs for hundreds of chemicals and substances." 8
OSHA's decision to update its consensus standards is exactly the aggres-
sive type of regulatory action that the Agency must begin to adopt if it is
to increase its productivity.
Nevertheless, OSHA's new proposal faces some significant legal hur-
dles. Although Congress expressly authorized the Agency to adopt consen-
sus standards in 1971,89 it made no provision for updating the standards.
Consequently, the update must meet the conditions specified by Congress
for adopting new health standards. Thus, OSHA must prove that workers
are at a "significant risk" unless an update occurs 40 and that any update
will protect workers to the extent that is "feasible."''
The "significant risk" test presents a dilemma for OSHA. If the
Agency attempts to prove that each of the hundreds of chemicals for which
it is adopting a new standard poses a significant risk, the job could take
years. OSHA has therefore proposed to make several generic findings that
workplaces exposing workers to concentrations greater than the updated
PELs pose a significant risk." 2 However, the Benzene decision" 3 may
make this solution ineffectual and may indeed require OSHA to prove
significant risk on a chemical-by-chemical basis.""
Although Benzene requires proof of significant risk, a generalized find-
ing should be sufficient to satisfy that obligation. The plurality opinion in
Benzene clearly stated that when OSHA attempted to quantify a risk, it
had considerable freedom to design an appropriate methodology.""
provided a minimum data set for each of 18 groups of workplace air contaminants, and has prepared
a brief discussion of the scientific basis for its proposed change for each individual substance regulated.
Finally, it has made generic economic and technological feasibility determinations that are entirely
independent of any similar considerations that may have motivated the experts in ACGIH and NI-
OSH in making their recommendations. OSHA appears to have made an honest effort to apply inde-
pendently the statutory criteria to an existing set of recommendations that are ultimately grounded in
a vast body of scientific literature. In addition, OSHA has indicated its intention to rely upon evidence
and arguments presented in the informal rulemaking hearings that it held in the summer of 1988 and
in written comments to the Agency in response to its notice of proposed rulemaking.
138. Molotsky, New Limits Imposed on Many Substances Found in Workplace, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 14, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1982).
140. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the
Occupational Health and Safety Act requires OSHA to prove a "significant risk" exists before it can
regulate health hazards. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 639.
141. 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1982).
142. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Air Contaminants, 53 Fed. Reg. 20,960 (1988).
143. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 652-53.
144. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (Benzene decision requires OSHA to prove
significant risk before it can regulate health hazards).
145. The plurality said that requiring a demonstration of significant risk would not "strip
[OSHA] of its ability to regulate carcinogens" and would not "require the Agency to wait for deaths
to occur before taking any action." 448 U.S. at 655. It recognized that the significant risk requirement
was not a "mathematical straitjacket" and that a determination of what was significant would be
"based largely on policy considerations." 448 U.S. at 655-56 n.62. The plurality also said that OSHA
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OSHA used a generic approach to make the significant risk determination
for its hazard communication rule,1 6 and the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals upheld the rule. 14 7 Finally, other Supreme Court decisions provide
indirect support for OSHA's use of generic risk assessments. Chemical
Manufacturers Association v. Natural Resources Defense Council"8 sug-
gested that courts should apply a deferential standard of review when an
agency interprets its enabling act and that courts should overrule the
agency only if "the statute clearly reveal[s] a contrary intent on the part of
Congress."' 49 Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc. 5 ' en-
dorsed an innovative generic approach to regulation employed by FDA on
the ground that, unless the Agency used that approach, it would be pre-
vented from accomplishing its legislative mandate. 5 '
The Occupational Safety and Health Act also requires OSHA to adopt
the most protective health standard that is "feasible."' 52 This requirement
presents two problems for OSHA. First, the Agency must prove that the
need not support its finding with "anything approaching scientific certainty" and that it can use
"conservative assumptions in interpreting . . . data, . . . risking error on the side of overprotection
rather than underprotection." 448 U.S. at 656. Finally, with regard to benzene, the plurality admitted
that a "precise correlation between exposure levels and cancer risks" may never be possible, but they
believed that quantifiable data would be "at least helpful" in performing risk assessments. 448 U.S. at
657 n.64.
Based on the previous comments, Professor Mintz believes that OSHA has "considerable flexibility
in performing risk assessments and determining that a risk [is] significant" and that the only impor-
tant limitation imposed on OSHA is that it cannot "avoid [risk assessment] entirely by relying on a
policy that makes attempts at quantitative estimation completely unnecessary." B. MINTZ, supra note
45, at 283. Professor Mintz's prediction seems to be borne out by the judicial deference accorded
OSHA after the Benzene case in the circuit courts. See, e.g., ASARCO, Inc. v. OSHA, 746 F.2d 483,
490-95 (9th Cir. 1984) (OSHA had substantial evidence that arsenic exposure posed significant risk);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (OSHA had substan-
tial evidence that lead exposure posed significant risk).
146. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,282-83 (1983).
147. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1985).
148. 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
149. 470 U.S. at 126. This holding is consistent with Benzene, which concluded that OSHA's
policy judgment to seek maximum feasible protection when a safe level of exposure for a chemical
could not be identified was an attempt to avoid the burden of proof that Congress had establish for
OSHA. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 662. Since no similar legislative prohibition exists against the use of
generic risk assessment, OSHA should be able to use this approach to update its consensus standards.
150. 412 U.S. 609 (1973).
151. FDA had made a generic determination not to hold a hearing before it removed from the
market thousands of drugs for which no reliable scientific evidence of efficacy existed. 412 U.S. at 610.
Although FDA is required by statute to hold a formal hearing before it removes any drug from the
market, 21 U.S.C. § 355(3) (1982), FDA had interpreted that provision to allow it to use a summary
judgment procedure to deny a hearing for drugs for which no reliable scientific evidence of efficacy
existed. The Court approved this innovation because, "[i]f FDA were required automatically to hold a
hearing for each product whose efficacy had been questioned[,] .. . we have no doubt that it could not
fulfill its statutory mandate to remove from the market all those drugs which do not meet the effective-
ness requirements of the Act." 412 U.S. at 621. OSHA's current posture is very similar to that of
FDA in the late 1960's. Like FDA, OSHA will be able to act effectively only if it can use an innova-
tive procedure that will avoid case-by-case determinations and its enabling act can be construed to
permit such a process.
152. 29 U.S.C. § 656(b)(5) (1982).
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PELs it is proposing are feasible or capable of being implemented by the
regulated industry.15 If OSHA must prove that each PEL is feasible, an
update of the consensus standards will no longer be practical."" However,
OSHA ought to be able to make generic findings concerning feasibility
based on the same kinds of authorities that support generic findings of
significant risk.1 5
Second, unions have opposed the update proposal on the ground that it
violates OSHA's mandate to seek the maximum protection feasible for
workers.' 56 The unions base their objection on the fact that the proposed
PELs for any given chemical could be less stringent than a full-fledged
OSHA standard for the same chemical. Moreover, unlike the consensus
standards, OSHA's individual standards ordinarily require, in addition to
a PEL, protections such as exposure monitoring, medical surveillance,
removal of employees to other work as a medical precaution, employee
training and education, and warning labels and signs.'" 7 The unions,
however, may be ignoring the overall effect of the proposed update. By
increasing the minimum levels of protection available to workers, the pro-
posed update protects millions of workers from dangerous chemicals. The
update will protect a greater number of workers, albeit to a lesser degree,
than any other type of regulation OSHA could adopt. The proposed
update thus meets the requirement that OSHA seek the most protection
feasible for workers. 58
2. Promulgate Generic Regulations
An update of the consensus standards will help solve the problem
caused by inadequate consensus standards. This update, however, will not
153. To prove a standard is feasible, OSHA must establish that it is technologically and economi-
cally capable of implementation. M. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH §§ 73-74
(1983). A standard is technologically feasible when OSHA establishes that "modern technology has at
least conceived some industrial strategies or devices which are likely to be capable of meeting the PEL
and which the industries are generally capable of adopting." United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall,
647 F.2d 1189, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Lead Indus. Ass'n v. Donovan, 453
U.S. 913 (1981). A standard is economically feasible when it is " 'capable of being done, executed or
affected.'" American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 508-09 (1981) (quoting WEB-
STER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1976)).
154. See supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
156. 3 Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 9815 (1988).
157. M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 153, § 66.
158. While OSHA has the authority to update its consensus standards, the union objections
should not be ignored. OSHA should consider the update an interim step and expeditiously meet its
obligation to promulgate stricter standards whenever there is evidence indicating that they are neces-
sary. Moreover, OSHA should require additional protection for workers (other than PELs) for all
chemicals that will be regulated under the new consensus standards. See infra notes 265-78 and
accompanying text (proposal that OSHA adopt regulation requiring additional protections for chemi-
cals regulated under consensus standards).
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address the problem created by OSHA's inability to adopt more than a
few full-fledged regulations each year. Thus, the Agency must maximize
the extent to which each regulation adopted protects workers. Generic
regulations, which. regulate more than one subject or problem in the same
rulemaking proceeding, 59 offer the greatest potential for maximum
worker protection. Although OSHA has promulgated some generic regu-
lations,' 60 most of its standards have addressed only one hazard at a
time.6 ' OSHA can adopt three types of generic standards: industry-wide
standards, multi-chemical standards, and work-practice standards.
a. Industry-Wide Standards
Industry-wide standards, by which OSHA regulates all of the signifi-
cant safety or health problems in a single industry,1 2 allow OSHA to
focus its attention on the most dangerous industries and on the most sig-
nificant risks in those industries. Industry-wide regulations also simplify
feasibility analysis, when a single risk reduction would address several
factors,163 and make abatement efforts less expensive when there are syn-
ergistic effects."" By implementing this type of standard, OSHA could
quickly regulate those industries where there is little opposition to regula-
tion, thereby providing immediate protection for some employees.' 65
159. Another type of generic regulation is one that resolves recurring or repetitive problems by
specifying how an agency will resolve the problem each time it comes up. See Procedures for Resolu-
tion of Environmental Issues In Licensing Proceedings (Recommendation 73-6), 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-6
(1988) (licensing agencies should use "generic proceedings" to resolve environmental issues "common
to more than one application and appropriate for across-the-board treatment"). OSHA adopted this
approach in its now defunct cancer policy, 29 C.F.R. § 1990.101 (1982), which attempted to resolve
in a single proceeding issues relating to worker exposure to carcinogens and thereby preclude the
necessity of resolving those issues on a case-by-case basis.
160. See infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
161. Through 1985, only four of OSHA's twenty-six safety standards and only five of its eighteen
health standards were generic. See U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PREVENTING ILL-
NESS AND INJURY IN THE WORKPLACE 363-64 (April 1985) [hereinafter PREVENTING INJURY];
Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 17, at 1305-09.
162. The Agency has promulgated rules for commercial diving operations, marine terminals, and
telecommunications. See PREVENTING INJURY, supra note 161, at 364. It is considering rules for such
industries as grain storage facilities, gas well drilling and servicing, and logging. U.S. OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (Apr. 1, 1986-
Mar. 31, 1987), at 266-68, 272-74, 295-96 [hereinafter REGULATORY PROGRAM]. The rubber pro-
duction and chemical manufacturing industries are good candidates for extending the generic
approach. Vladeck interview, supra note 29; Holtzman interview, supra note 68. Similarly, OSHA
has regulated common problems that occur in many industries by setting generic standards for fire
protection, noise exposure and hearing conservation, employee access to medical and exposure records,
and information concerning workplace hazards. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95 (1988) (noise exposure and
hearing conservation standard); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.20(b)-(e) (employee access to medical and exposure
records standard); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1988) (hazard communication standard).
163. Jacoby interview, supra note 114.
164. Kronenbush interview, supra note 130.
165. Vladeck interview, supra note 29 (industry-wide standards would speed regulation in indus-
tries where compliance is easier). See Perritt, Analysis of Four Negotiated Rulemaking Efforts, in
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Industry-wide standards also have several disadvantages. First, OSHA
needs a great deal of information about individual industries to promul-
gate industry-wide standards.166 Second, since a small number of firms in
particular industries would bear all of the costs, OSHA should expect
significant and perhaps coordinated business resistance."' Third, because
industry-wide standards focus broadly on the feasibility of employing
technologies across entire industries, OSHA is open to individual com-
plaints that it is imposing costs inequitably."' Fourth, workers would
probably oppose the generic approach if OSHA began to make trade-offs
in the stringency of exposure limits for different chemicals. 69 Fifth, work-
ers in unregulated industries exposed to the same chemicals might also
oppose this approach,"'7 thus requiring OSHA to provide a reasoned
explanation for its discrimination.' 7 ' Finally, if the Agency must make a
"significant risk" determination for each hazard in the chosen industry, a
generic standard may be impossible for some industries. " 2
Although industry-wide generic standards will probably never play a
large role in OSHA standard-setting, the Agency should consider them in
appropriate instances. OSHA should consider this device when: (1) it can
narrowly define an industry targeted for such regulation; (2) most of the
hazards to be regulated are unique to that industry (or other industries
that OSHA plans to regulate in the near future); (3) the hazards are
likely to be relatively stable over time; (4) industry-wide generic rulemak-
ing would impose fewer costs on the industry than standards for individ-
ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 637, 698 (1985).
166. Gordon interview, supra note 104.
167. Seminario interview, supra note 89. OSHA might be able to offset this effect, however, by
engaging in consensus building through negotiated rulemaking or advisory committees. See infra notes
189-211 and accompanying text.
168. Sevin interview, supra note 90. This problem would be intensified if OSHA had difficulty
defining what constitutes a discrete industry, a problem that frequently plagues EPA in promulgating
standards under the Clean Water Act. Frodyma interview, supra note 43; Jacoby interview, supra
note 114; see also A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES AND PUBLIC POLICY 62 n.9
(1975).
169. Since individual workers are often exposed to only a single chemical, they would gain no
benefit from any trade-offs in the level of protection negotiated between OSHA and industry. Inter-
view with Jack Sheehan, United Steelworkers of America, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 30, 1986). This
possibility would be greater if the Agency engaged in negotiated rulemaking.
170. Martonik interview, supra note 41 (unions oppose any approach that creates second-class
citizens who are not protected from some hazard); F. White interview, supra note 41; Interview with
Charles Adkins, Director, Directorate of Health Standards, OSHA, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 26,
1986).
171. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1985) (OSHA failed to
explain adequately why it could not apply coverage).
172. For example, producers in the paint and allied products industry use literally thousands of
unrelated chemicals and the identity of the relevant chemicals shifts as production lines change from
year to year or even batch to batch. Even for industries with a fairly stable set of hazards, industry-
wide standards would generate only narrow efficiencies resulting from simplified feasibility analysis.
Yale Journal on Regulation
ual hazards; and (5) the industry-wide generic approach would be more
efficient for OSHA.
b. Multi-Chemical Standards
OSHA might also consider promulgating standards that regulate two or
more chemicals at one time."7 8 The primary advantage of this approach is
that it would allow OSHA to prepare a generic risk assessment for all of
the regulated chemicals. Multi-chemical standards might also simplify the
feasibility analysis if the same types of abatement techniques were availa-
ble for all of the chemicals. There are limits, however, upon the extent to
which OSHA may base a significant risk determination on a generic risk
assessment for chemicals having dissimilar characteristics. Moreover,
because there is no guarantee that chemicals with similar toxicological
characteristics will be used to perform similar functions, separate feasibil-
ity analyses might also be necessary. Finally, since different chemicals
may be used in many different industries, a multi-chemical standard
might well attract a larger number of dissatisfied parties than either the
traditional case-by-case approach or industry-wide generic standards.7 4
Despite these difficulties, OSHA should attempt to identify situations in
which a multi-chemical approach would be cost-effective for the Agency.
c. Work-Practice Standards
A work-practice standard specifies some protective technology or work
practice.'75 Generic work-practice standards allow OSHA to make generic
risk and feasibility assessments that are independent of the individual
workplace; therefore, OSHA can efficiently protect a large number of
workers in many industries. Because the standards do not focus on a par-
ticular chemical or a particular industry, opposition to their implementa-
173. In 1974, OSHA promulgated this type of standard for 14 carcinogens that had similar chem-
ical properties. See Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 506 F.2d 385 (3d Cir. 1974);
Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1974). Some observers have
recommended that it establish more, including standards for solvents, wood preservatives, dusts, and
neurotoxins. E.g., Kronenbush interview, supra note 130.
174. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
175. Good examples are OSHA's hazard communication standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200
(1988), and its medical and exposure records access rule, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.20(b)-(e) (1983). In many
of its individual health standards, OSHA requires employers to provide general services such as expo-
sure monitoring, warning labels and signs, and others. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
OSHA could promulgate generic work practice standards requiring some of the same protections for
any employer subject to a consensus PEL. Martonik interview, supra note 41; Jacoby interview,
supra note 114; see also supra notes 136-141 and accompanying text (discussion of work practice
standards for employers subject to consensus PELs). In addition, OSHA could prescribe on a generic
basis protective technologies and procedures, such as respirators for workers who are exposed to air-
borne chemical hazards and ventilation techniques for chemical holding tanks. REGULATORY PRO-
GRAM, supra note 162, at 260-61; Kronenbush interview, supra note 130.
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tion may be moderated. For individual workplaces where the require-
ments of a generic work-practice standard are inappropriate, OSHA can
craft criteria for granting case-by-case variances.176
C. Adopt Faster Approaches To Regulation
Generic approaches hold some promise for increasing the extent to
which each standard protects workers. Nevertheless, the numerous
problems associated with such approaches suggest that OSHA should con-
sider additional solutions to its regulatory productivity problem. Since
many OSHA standards currently take six to eight years to promulgate,' 77
workers would clearly benefit if the Agency could act faster. One strategy
for speeding up OSHA rulemaking is to adopt regulatory solutions that
minimize the opposition by some or all of the interested parties. Another
strategy mandates that OSHA improve the efficiency of its rulemaking
procedures.
1. Minimize Regulatory Opposition
OSHA has traditionally assumed an adversarial orientation toward set-
ting health and safety standards. Under this approach, the Agency pro-
poses what it perceives to be the best regulation, receives data and argu-
ments from interested parties, and then determines whether the proposed
rule is justified by the evidence. 78 Critics maintain that this process is ill-
suited for making regulatory decisions that are essentially legislative in
nature, require political compromises, and have no ideal solution. 79
Moreover, this effort is time-consuming because the evidence is rarely
clear-cut, limited Agency resources make it difficult to conduct many
standard-setting activities at the same time, strict regulations engender
more political controversy, and it requires OSHA to expend substantial
176. To the extent that work-practice standards tend to address relatively uncontroversial "boiler
plate" topics, they are not likely to reduce OSHA's overall workload appreciably. Still, they can
sometimes be quite useful in eliminating the need to address recurring issues in individual
proceedings.
177. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
178. See Boyer, Alternatives To Administrative Trial-Type Hearings For Resolving Complex
Scientific, Economic and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. REV. 111, 122-133 (1972) (attributes of
advocacy-hearing process).
179. See, e.g., Oversight on the Administration of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1981:
Hearings Before Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight and the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1981) [hereinafter 1981
Oversight Hearings] (statement of Robert Thompson, U.S. Chamber of Commerce); Bokat interview,
supra note 42 (OSHA ends up worrying about trivial matters because administrators are unwilling to
compromise); see also Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183, 1184,
1188 (1973) (criticizing adjudicative model on assumption that nonpolitical resolution of issues is
possible).
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resources preparing to defend "strict" regulations that will inevitably be
attacked in court.180
Proponents of the adversarial approach argue that OSHA's statutory
mandate requires it to seek the most protection feasible for workers 8' and
that it is inappropriate (or even immoral) for a health and safety agency
to make trade-offs concerning dangers to human life.' 82 Moreover, they
contend that a consensus approach ultimately devolves to industry self-
regulation with little or no government supervision' 83 and that a consen-
sus approach designed to conciliate industry will therefore engender the
opposition of labor unions, who often regard current regulations as too
weak.' 84
Critics counter that because of the Agency's slow pace, it either does not
regulate hazards or does so inadequately.'8 They argue OSHA could bet-
ter protect workers by proposing less stringent regulations that could be
adopted more rapidly, mediating disputes and implementing the positions
of affected parties, and placing greater reliance on advisory committees to
guide the way to consensus positions.'" 6 They further argue that if OSHA
adopted a more cooperative attitude, industry would share technical
knowledge and experience which OSHA lacks and needs to regulate more
effectively.18
7
However, union representatives counter that some companies will fight
less stringent standards just as fiercely. They contend that the issue of
control over the workplace is a matter of principle. In addition, they ques-
tion whether adopting a standard that the regulated firms can live with
provides sufficient practical protection for workers.'
Although those opposed to consensus approaches raise valid objections,
180. Mendeloff, supra note 16, at 442-43.
181. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1982).
182. B. White interview, supra note 41; S. KELMAN, REGULATING AMERICA, REGULATING
SWEDEN: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY POLICY 81 (1981).
183. See C. NOBLE, LIBERALISM AT WORK THE RISE AND FALL OF OSHA 181-82 (1986).
184. B. White interview, supra note 41 (Assistant Secretary of OSHA inhibited from consensus
approach because of antagonistic views of labor unions). Moreover, even though the consensus ap-
proach is widely used in other countries, supporters note that it may not be very adaptable to an
American system of administration, in which advocacy and conflict are predominant. G. WILSON,
THE POLITICS OF SAFETY AND HEALTH: OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH IN THE UNITED
STATES & BRITAIN 151 (1985); R. BRICKMAN, S. JASANOFF & R. ILGEN, CONTROLLING CHEMI-
CALS: THE POLITICS OF REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 314 (1985).
185. See, e.g., Mendeloff, supra note 16, at 441.
186. See, e.g., id.; Mendeloff, supra note 32, at 51; Levin, supra note 32, at 38. See generally
Harter, Dispute Resolution and Administrative Law: The History, Needs, and Future of A Complex
Relationship, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1393 (1984); Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Case of Malaise,
71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982) [hereinafter Harter, Negotiating Regulations].
187. Gombar interview, supra note 76 (in consensus approach industry would share information
that Agency currently lacks).
188. Seminario interview, supra note 89.
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OSHA cannot afford to ignore entirely this method of speeding up its
efforts. OSHA's traditional reliance on adversarial approaches has pro-
duced so few standards that the Agency must consider whether a consen-
sus orientation would be of some value. Three consensus-oriented tech-
niques-negotiated rulemaking, advisory committees, and flexible
regulatory standards-offer some hope of generating at least some solu-
tions that are acceptable to all concerned. The Agency must, however,
carefully avoid conveying the impression that its use of a consensus-based
approach is inspired by a desire to avoid conflict with industry at the
expense of worker safety.
a. Negotiated Rulemaking
In the past few years, negotiated rulemaking has been a popular tech-
nique for drafting the text of proposed regulations.18 Negotiated
rulemaking is a structured discussion among all interested parties, often
with the aid of a mediator or facilitator. The goal of this discussion is to
arrive at a consensus on a proposed rule.' 90 When the process is success-
ful, the Agency can promulgate the proposed rule with substantial savings
in costs and time. 9 ' Some observers believe negotiated rulemaking will
not work at OSHA,'92 but others are more optimistic. 9 OSHA has
189. See Recommendation 85-5: Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, in ADMIN.
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, 23-27 (1985); Procedures for Nego-
tiating Proposed Regulations (Recommendation 82-4), 1 C.F.R. 305.82-4 (1988); Perritt, supra note
165, at 677-745.
190. See generally Harter, Negotiating Regulations, supra note 186.
191. Other advantages include the avoidance of litigation, the possibility of more accurately identi-
fying the real concerns of the parties (because they do not engage in the posturing that occurs in
litigation), the opportunity to gauge the intensity of the parties' concerns over various issues, and the
legitimacy the promulgated rule will enjoy because it was a joint product of the Agency and the
parties. See id. at 28-31.
192. The doubters argue there is too much distrust between management and labor for this idea
to function effectively, Mintz interview, supra note 28; Vladeck interview, supra note 29; that its
usefulness is limited because OSHA and labor have only a limited number of experts who can partici-
pate, Kronenbush interview, supra note 130, that OSHA uses regulatory negotiations to stall difficult
decisions, see, e.g., 1984 O.S.H. Rep. 1339 (BNA) (May 24, 1984) (union representative criticizes
OSHA for using mediation as means to delay benzene rulemaking), that industry will not cooperate
because OSHA is unlikely to issue a rule anyway, Vladeck interview, supra note 29; Railton inter-
view, supra note 110, and that OSHA employees will object that negotiated rulemaking compromises
the Agency's mission or reduces their authority. See Mendeloff, supra note 16, at 456. See generally,
Rothstein, Substantive and Procedural Obstacles to OSHA Rulemaking: Reproductive Hazards As
An Example, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 627, 664 (1985) (former OSHA administrators Corn and
Bingham were "skeptical about negotiated rulemaking"); Schuck, Litigation, Bargaining and Regu-
lation, REGULATION, July-Aug. 1979, at 34 ("[Djirect bargaining between interests will probably
never play a major role in the development of regulatory policy and regulatory decisions.").
193. Supporters of regulatory negotiations stress that labor and management somehow reach
agreements in collective bargaining, Railton interview, supra note 110, and maintain that bargaining
over health and safety issues will work if OSHA becomes a more active participant. See Perritt, supra
note 165, at 755 (benzene process would have benefited from OSHA participation). They explain that
several conditions are necessary for a successful result, see Harter, Negotiating Regulations, supra
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recently proposed a rule that resulted from negotiated rulemaking, 9 but
its other efforts at mediation have not been very successful.' 95
Negotiated rulemaking is not likely to succeed in large generic rulemak-
ing efforts. Nor is it likely to be useful in addressing issues, such as the
use of respirators versus engineering controls, about which the positions of
the interested participants have already hardened. Negotiated rulemaking
may also fail for topics in which a large number of parties have widely
divergent interests. On the other hand, negotiated rulemaking might be
entirely appropriate for new topics, such as risks posed in the pharmaceu-
tical industry by genetically engineered microorganisms, about which po-
sitions have not yet been formed and for which large investments have not
yet been made. Finally, a precondition to a successful negotiated rulemak-
ing is equality in participants' power to affect the outcome of the proceed-
ing if the negotiations falter. A party in a very powerful position to influ-
ence the outcome is likely to have a disproportionate impact on
negotiations. Knowing this, weaker parties may refrain from participating
at the outset. 96
Given these constraints, OSHA should evaluate the possibility of using
negotiated rulemaking on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, although negoti-
ated rulemaking has a significant potential for speeding up the regulatory
process, the Agency must develop devices for abandoning it when the
negotiations reach a stalemate. Otherwise, OSHA's already slow decision-
making process will slow further. The best solution may be to set an
irrevocable deadline at the outset for the completion of any regulatory ne-
gotiation. As the deadline nears, the Agency should continue its own
rulemaking efforts to minimize the time lost in negotiations if they fail.
note 186, at 42-52 (listing conditions for successful negotiations); Perritt, supra note 165, at 671-75
(also listing conditions); and that many of these were missing in OSHA's failures at mediation. Id. at
692-93. Finally, supporters argue that even if negotiations fail, OSHA will gain a better understand-
ing of the issues and a feel for what the parties can accept. Bokat interview, supra note 42.
194. See Methylenedianiline (MDA) Mediated Rulemaking Advisory Committee Recommenda-
tions, 52 Fed. Reg. 26,776 (1987) (recommendations of MDA negotiated rulemaking advisory
committee).
195. In 1976, regulations controlling coke oven emissions were adopted in accordance with agree-
ments reached among OSHA, industry, and organized labor, Exposure to Coke Oven Emissions, 41
Fed. Reg. 46,742 (1976), but these efforts did not foresiall a legal challenge to the regulations. See
American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978). In 1983, mediation was used to
a limited extent, with OSHA involvement, concerning the cotton dust standard. See Perritt, supra
note 165, at 747. In the same year, an ambitious effort to mediate an agreement concerning the
benzene standard failed. Id. at 677.
196. See Perritt, supra note 165, at 664-68.
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b. Advisory Committees
OSHA may be able to build a consensus on some aspects of proposed
regulations by using advisory committees. Although OSHA does seek
some advice from the National Advisory Committee of Occupational
Safety and Health (NACOSH),"9 ' it has not appointed a rulemaking
advisory committee since 1976.9" OSHA apparently abandoned rulemak-
ing advisory committees because they did not function well. 99 and the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act subjected them to unreasonably short
deadlines. 00
OSHA could gain some important advantages by resuming the appoint-
ment of rulemaking advisory committees. Advisory committees can assist
an agency by explaining complex technical issues, providing peer review
for agency decisions, identifying areas of consensus among scientists, and
expanding the participation of interested experts in agency decisionmak-
ing.2 °1 When they function in this fashion, committees improve the credi-
bility of agency decisions, and thereby increase their acceptance.2"2 The
usefulness of such committees, however, is limited to issues of science,
where technical expertise is critical, and does not extend to policy ques-
197. NACOSH, which is composed of 12 members, makes "recommendations ... relating to the
administration of the [Occupational Safety and Health Act]." 29 U.S.C. § 656(a) (1982). Some mem-
bers of NACOSH have found it to be a useful forum to air significant issues, e.g., Ashford, The Role
of Advisory Committees in Resolving Regulatory Issues Involving Science and Technology:
Experience from OSHA and EPA, in LAW AND SCIENCE IN COLLABORATION: RESOLVING REGULA-
TORY ISSUES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 165, 172 (1983) [hereinafter Ashford, Role of Advisory
Committees], but an ACUS report found that the Committee's role has always been a secondary one
and that over time its importance has declined. Merrill, supra note 19 at 147. OSHA continues to
rely on NACOSH, but it has been criticized for not using it enough. See, e.g., 1981 Oversight Hear-
ings, supra note 179, at 210-11 (Statement of Ray Denison, AFL-CIO) (OSHA should make better
use of NACOSH); Ashford, Advisory Committees in OSHA and EPA: Their Use In Regulatory Deci-
sionmaking, 9 Sci. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 72, 79 (1984) (OSHA should make better use of
NACOSH).
198. B. MINTZ, supra note 45, at 65. PREVENTING INJURY, supra note 161, at 65.
199. T. GREENWOOD, supra note 38, at 125 (committees were only a forum for labor and em-
ployers to argue with each other); B. MINTZ, supra note 45, at 65 (OSHA, on balance, found use of
committees burdensome); L. BACOW, BARGAINING FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
41-42 (1980) (committees became "tools for political manipulation"); Risk Assessment Research,
1984: Hearings on H.R. 4192 Before the Subcomm. on Natural Resources and Environment of the
House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-23 (1985) (statement of Nicholas
Ashford, MIT) (OSHA often disagreed with committee recommendations).
200. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(1) (1982) (maximum 270 day deadline for committee to complete work);
id. § 655(b)(2) (OSHA must propose standard 60 days after committee finishes work); see Tomlinson,
Report on the Experience of Various Agencies with Statutory Time Limits Applicable to Licensing or
Clearance Functions and to Rulemaking, in ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDA-
TIONS AND REPORTS 207 (1978) (OSHA had considerable difficulty complying with statutory dead-
lines concerning advisory committees).
201. See RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 23, at 98; Ashford,
supra note 197, at 166; Merrill, supra note 19, at 135-56.
202. Shapiro, Scientific Issues, supra note 23, at 306-07.
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tions, where technical expertise has no particular virtue.2"3 Although advi-
sory committees should not assist OSHA in making policy decisions,
Agency administrators would still benefit if the committees were to indi-
cate when a consensus existed concerning the scientific data upon which
the Agency might base policy decisions.
If OSHA is to use rulemaking advisory committees effectively in the
future, it will have to overcome the problems that led the Agency to aban-
don their use. While some observers believe these problems can be
solved, 04 others are less confident. 5 OSHA has limited use for advisory
committees under the existing law; such committees could be more useful
if Congress eliminated the current requirements concerning committee
membership and time deadlines. The problem with committee member-
ship requirements is that because OSHA must appoint an equal number
of representatives of labor and management, this requirement limits the
number of independent experts it can appoint.206 Moreover, there is little
doubt that this requirement contributes to the politicized and adversarial
nature of OSHA committees and limits the range of their expertise.20 7
Although there may be a way for OSHA to reduce the number of mem-
bers appointed from management and labor,20 a better solution would be
for Congress to eliminate the present membership qualifications and
replace them with a simple requirement that membership be "bal-
anced. ' 20 9 While OSHA faces statutory time deadlines which are difficult
203. T. GREENWOOD, supra note 38, at 229 ("Expert panels often do not admit (and may not
even recognize) when they go beyond science or engineering knowledge in reaching their
conclusions.").
204. See, e.g., RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 23, at 98; Gombar
interview, supra note 76 (advisory committees would benefit OSHA decisionmaking); Railton inter-
view, supra note 110 (advisory committees would extend OSHA's scientific expertise).
205. Vladeck interview, supra note 29 (committees will not work because industry will not coop-
erate); Mintz interview, supra note 28 (conflict would erupt between industry and labor in advisory
committees).
206. Membership, which is composed of 15 or fewer persons, must include one designee of the
Secretary of HHS, at least one representative of state health and safety agencies, and an equal num-
ber of representatives from labor and management. 29 U.S.C. § 656(b)(1) (1982). The Secretary of
Labor may appoint other persons with expertise in the area of occupational safety and health, but the
number of such persons cannot exceed the number appointed to the committee as representatives of
federal and state agencies. Id.
207. See supra notes 57-72 and accompanying text.
208. OSHA must include an equal number of representatives from management and labor, but
the existing law does not specify how many such representatives must be appointed. 29 U.S.C.
§ 656(b)(1) (1982). If OSHA were to appoint only one person each from labor and management, it
would be able to appoint a majority of the committee based on their expertise. A committee with a
majority of independent or government scientists might have a better chance of operating as a scientific
body, rather than as a group of individual advocates for management or labor. Rothstein, supra note
192, at 655-56.
209. See Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(2) (1982) (all government advi-
sory committees must have membership "fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented
and the functions to be performed.").
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to meet, the Agency can comply if it takes special precautions.' 1" Because
these suggestions will not work in many circumstances, however, legisla-
tive action to eliminate the deadlines is appropriate.21'
c. More Flexible Standards
In addition to using procedures like negotiated rulemaking and advisory
committees that may produce a consensus concerning a regulatory issue,
OSHA can also reduce the opposition to its regulations by adopting more
flexible standards. One of industry's principal criticisms has been that
OSHA has been too quick to order the use of a specific design (a design
standard) rather than allowing firms to meet mandatory safety goals by
whatever design they choose (a performance standard).2"2 Although this
criticism is not entirely accurate or fair,2"' OSHA may benefit from the
increased use of performance standards.
Greater use of performance standards may reduce industry opposition
because this type of regulation generally reduces industry compliance
costs.214 Moreover, performance standards may be less time-consuming for
OSHA to adopt. 1 But unless performance standards are as protective of
workers as design standards, labor opposition could provoke considerable
litigation and controversy.216 Thus, OSHA should consider using per-
210. OSHA can limit the issues it refers to a committee to the most difficult scientific and techno-
logical issues, it can carefully monitor the committee's progress, and it can use existing deadlines as
leverage to prompt action. See Tomlinson, supra note 200, at 206-07 (OSHA can meet deadlines in
certain instances).
211. Existing deadlines should be eliminated in favor of deadlines established by the Agency itself,
as recommended later in this Article. See infra notes 291-322 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., 1981 Oversight Hearings, supra note 179, at 156 (Statement of Robert Thompson,
U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (criticism of design standards); Viscusi, supra note 21, at 248 (criticism
of design standards). See generally PREVENTING INJURY, supra note 161, at 363-64; Schroeder &
Shapiro, supra note 17, at 1305-09.
213. The PELs that are the core of OSHA's health regulations are performance-oriented. Mor-
gan & Duvall, OSHA's General Duty Clause: An Analysis of Its Use and Abuse, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J.
283, 319 (1983) (employers are free to use any technology (other than respirators) capable of achiev-
ing ambient concentration specified in PEL). Moreover, OSHA has attempted in recent years to ex-
pand its use of the performance-oriented approach beyond use of PELs. The hazardous communica-
tion standard permits firms to design their own labeling systems, and the grain-handling standard
allows a firm to use any one of several methods to decrease grain dust. Viscusi, supra note 21, at
251-52.
214. A performance standard frees industry to choose the method of compliance with the lowest
costs, to design methods of compliance that are easily understood, and to discover and adopt less
expensive methods of compliance in the future. Nichol & Zeckhauser, OSHA after a Decade: A Time
for Reason, in CASE STUDIES IN REGULATION: REVOLUTION AND REFORM 203 (1981); OSHA
SAFETY REGULATION: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE 14, 18 (P. MacAvoy ed. 1977)
[hereinafter OSHA SAFETY REGULATION]; R. SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
ACT: ITS GOALS & ACHIEVEMENTS 75-77 (1976); Viscusi, supra note 21, at 248.
215. OSHA must know a great deal about an industry when it promulgates a design standard and
this information usually comes from industry itself. These enormous information requirements virtu-
ally ensure that the pace of regulation will be slow.
216. Design standards have the advantage of creating precise expectations for employers, facilitat-
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formance standards when they offer the same degree of protection as
design standards, lower industry compliance costs, and can be easily un-
derstood and monitored. In these circumstances, the use of performance
standards is Pareto-superior, because they yield the same benefits at a
lower cost.217
In the minds of some reformers, information-oriented standards provide
a more flexible approach to regulation.218 They propose that OSHA
increase its efforts to provide workers with more information about safety
and health hazards. The reformers believe that because this solution
addresses the failure of labor markets to provide information, it assists
those markets to promote additional safety. In theory, workers will use
this information to change their conduct in dangerous situations, bargain
for wage premiums for dangerous work, and participate more effectively
in relevant legislative and administrative proceedings. 19 Proponents of
information-oriented standards therefore applaud OSHA's hazardous
communication rule 20 and urge OSHA to increase its efforts to provide or
require written materials and training programs for workers.22" '
While increased reliance on information-oriented programs will no
doubt aid uninformed workers,222 it is not enough to protect all workers
adequately.22 In particular, workers in unregulated labor markets have
been unable to obtain protection from hazards even when those hazards
ing the ability of employees and OSHA inspectors to monitor compliance, and permitting OSHA to
require employers to implement new safety technologies. OSHA SAFETY REGULATION, supra note
214, at 18, For the previous reasons, opponents of performance standards argue they are often unen-
forceable and therefore tend to shift the burden of risk avoidance from the employer to the worker. Id.
at 19. Moreover, employers may lack the expertise and resources to translate perfomance criteria into
suitable engineering designs, especially at small firms that can ill-afford to hire outside expertise. Id.
217. See A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPETITION, COORDINA-
TION AND CONTROL 76 (3rd ed. 1983).
218. See, e.g., W. VIscusI, RISK BY CHOICE 37-58 (1983); R. SMITH, THE OCCUPATION
SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT 27-28 (1976); Zeckhauser & Nichol, The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration-An Overview, in SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T AFFAIRS, STUDY ON FEDERAL
REGULATION, VOL. VI APPENDIX, S. Doc. No. 96-14, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 169, 172 (1978).
219. Viscusi, supra note 21 at 248; Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 17, at 1295-97.
220. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,280 (1983) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910 (1988)) (requiring employ-
ers to place warning labels on containers of hazardous chemicals, to provide employees with material
safety data sheet, and to train employees to use information provided).
221. See, e.g., Nichol & Zeckhauser, supra note 214, at 228; R. SMITH, supra note 214, at
77-78.
222. See Viscusi & O'Connor, Adaptive Responses to Chemical Labeling: Are Workers Bayesian
Decision Makers?, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 942 (1984) (providing information protects workers as long as
information is new knowledge rather than general exhortations to act safely).
223. Communicating long-term risks are much more difficult for OSHA to communicate than
short-term risks. S. HADDEN, READ THE LABEL, 101-13 (1986). Moreover, OSHA cannot easily
determine in which industries it should require information programs concerning long-term risks
because the information about those risks is so scarce. Id. In addition, complex problems of trade
secrecy arise whenever information relevant to communicating workplace risks can also be used by
competitors to the employer's disadvantage. McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 30, at 838 (1980).
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are well known to the workers.224 Thus, while OSHA should continue to
explore how it can increase the information available to workers, such
solutions will never be a substitute for health and safety standards.
2. More Efficient Procedures
OSHA can also increase the number of regulations it issues by adopting
more efficient procedures. Three possible changes can be considered:
adoption of a less formal hearing process, limited use of advance notices of
proposed rulemaking, and improved preparation of the record.
a. An Informal Hearing Process
OSHA uses a hybrid form of rulemaking to promulgate health stan-
dards. According to its enabling Act, OSHA can use informal rulemaking
unless an interested person requests a hearing, which almost always hap-
pens.225 OSHA regulations provide that an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) shall preside, the ALJ shall allow cross-examination on crucial
issues, and a verbatim transcript shall be kept. 2 Although OSHA could
legally forego some of these procedures, such as cross-examination,227 do-
ing so will probably have little impact on the pace of OSHA decisionmak-
ing. Because the time elapsed in hearings is only a small portion of the
time consumed in internal decisionmaking and judicial review,22 stream-
lining the hearing process will not greatly help the Agency increase its
224. Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 17, at 1240-42 (proof that workers can obtain protection
from health hazards without OSHA regulation difficult to establish empirically); see Abel, Book
Review, 83 MIcH. L. REV. 772, 777 n.15 (1985) (reviewing E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GOING By
THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982)) (discussion of wage pre-
miums obscures "compulsion and exploitation of workers").
225. OSHA has held a hearing for all but one of its first eighteen health standards and for all but
nine of its first twenty-six safety standards. PREVENTING INJURY, supra note 161, at 363-64.
226. 29 C.F.R. § 1911.15(b) (1988). OSHA typically requests witnesses to pre-file testimony, to
limit oral presentations to 10 or 15 minutes, and to participate in a prehearing conference with the
Agency staff. Whenever possible, the Agency also limits the issues to be covered at a hearing. Finally,
OSHA arranges for experts to explain the technical basis for its proposals and, more generally, to
answer questions and help develop a full technical record on the issues in the proceeding. B. MINTZ,
supra note 45, at 63-64. For example, OSHA presented 46 experts in the field of cancer research in
the hearing held for the Agency's cancer policy. Id.
227. An agency is required to use formal rulemaking only when Congress has required that a rule
be made "on the record after an opportunity for an agency hearing." United States v. Fla. East Coast
Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973). Congress made no such requirement of OSHA.
228. The following table indicates the time elapsed for the various components of the process:
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regulatory output. 29 Moreover, hybrid procedures may be useful in
resolving some kinds of scientific disputes.28 Hybrid procedures, when
properly applied, can be especially useful in probing cost and feasibility
issues, which often require an evaluation of conclusions drawn from anec-
dotal evidence and unscientific telephone surveys. Finally, if procedural
changes were to affect adversely the quality of OSHA's decisionmaking,
the Agency could suffer an increase in judicial remands and a loss of pub-
lic confidence. OSHA can best address delays caused by hybrid procedures
by setting strict deadlines for hearings and by ensuring that ALJs do not
feel constrained to grant every request for cross-examination or continu-
ance out of fear of reversal by the Agency.
b. Advance Notices of Proposed Rulemaking
OSHA has shown an increasing tendency to rely routinely on Advance
Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRs) to solicit information from
regulated industries, beneficiary groups, and other interested parties.231




Standards Hearing Making Review Process
Asbestos 3 days 4 mos. 21 mos. 25 mos.
14 Carcinogens 3 days 11 mos. 10 mos. 21 mos.
Vinyl Chloride 6 days 85 mos. 2 mos. 7 mos.
Coke Oven Emissions 75 days 63 mos. 16 mos. 79 mos.
Benzene 22 days 21 mos. 28 mos. 49 mos.
DBCP 2 days 6 mos. none 6 mos.
Arsenic 12 days 51 mos. 34 mos. 85 mos.
Lead 49 days 69 mos. 20 mos. 89 mos.
Cotton Fiber Dust 7 days 44 mos. 35 mos. 79 mos.
Acrylonitrile 11 days 18 mos. none 18 mos.
Noise 24 days 100 mos. 46 mos. 146 mos.
See Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 17, at 1305-09; McGarity, OSHA's Generic Carcinogen Policy:
Rule Making Under Scientific and Legal Uncertainty, in LAW & SCIENCE IN COLLABORATION 78
(1983).
229. McGarity, supra note 228, at 78.
230. Shapiro, Scientific Issues, supra note 23, at 297-98. One long-time analyst of OSHA
believes Agency decisionmaking has generally benefited from the hybrid approach; B. MINTZ, Supra
note 45, at 65-66.
231. An Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) is a tool used much earlier in the
rulemaking process than the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). Typically, the NPRM is the
last notice published before the adoption of the rule; therefore, it must be in substance substantially
the same as the final rule. In contrast, the ANPR serves many functions. An agency may use this
advance notice to request comments or solutions to a general problem. By publishing an ANPR, the
Agency indicates that it has recognized and may in the future address a certain problem area. OSHA
used an ANPR in only one of.the first sixteen health standards it promulgated and in only one of the
first twenty-six safety standards. PREVENTING INJURY, supra note 161, at 363-64. It then used an
ANPR in four of the next six health standards it proposed. Id.; Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 17,
at 1305-09.
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and ideas at an early stage in a rule's development, " ' there is a general
feeling among Agency staff and outside practitioners that it rarely results
in the production of useful information for OSHA. " ' At the same time,
the ANPR slows the progress of Agency contractors, who are understand-
ably reluctant to complete their reports until they have assimilated any
information that an ANPR produces. " 4 Moreover, Agency administrators
can use the process, which can last from six months to a year, to avoid
hard decisions." ' Invoking the ANPR process demonstrates some move-
ment by the Agency, but does not necessitate any final decisions. For these
reasons, the ANPR should be used only when information that is not
available through other vehicles is very likely to be forthcoming in
response to the ANPR.
c. Preparation of the Record
Some Agency staffers and most representatives of beneficiary groups
believe that because OSHA goes to extreme lengths to perfect the record
in a rulemaking proceeding to avoid reversal on appeal, the Agency need-
lessly delays the promulgation of a final rule."8 6 They point to 100-page
preambles that discuss every minor contention raised in the comments as
evidence of overpreparation of the record. Most industry representatives
forcefully dispute this idea and contend that OSHA must establish a
sound technical basis for its rules. OSHA's attorneys in the Solicitor's
Office are also convinced that elaborate analysis and documentation are
necessary to survive judicial review, and they explain that concern for the
quality of the Agency's analysis accounts for much of the delay caused by
their office. " "
Although the Solicitor's Office should be free to determine the type of
record that is necessary for the Agency to prevail on judicial review, attor-
neys in that office should be subject to reasonable time constraints. Even
under the pressure of such deadlines, the Solicitor's Office cannot become
232. See I C.F.R. § 305.76-3(o (1986) (suggesting that ANPRs are effective when: "(1) the
scientific, technical or other data relevant to the proposed rule are complex; (2) the problem posed is
so open-ended that an agency may profit from receiving diverse public views before publishing a
proposed rule for final comment; and (3) the costs that errors in the rule may impose, including
health, welfare and environmental losses imposed on the public and pecuniary expenses imposed on
the affected industries and consumers of their products, are significant.").
233. Outside parties are simply unwilling to scour their files for information at this early stage,
and to the extent that information that is not readily available to OSHA is available to outside parties,
they are often unwilling to provide it and incur the risk of revealing or foreclosing later strategies.
Harwood interview, supra note 109; Gas interview, supra note 98.
234. Gordon interview, supra note 104.
235. Stein interview, supra note 85.
236. Harwood interview, supra note 109; B. White interview, supra note 41.
237. Jacoby interview, supra note 114.
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more productive without additional resources.2"8 Given the current
absence of any mechanism for holding the Solicitor's Office accountable
for delays, it is impossible to say whether it has been underfunded inad-
vertently or as part of a deliberate attempt by budget managers in the
DOL or OMB to slow down OSHA rulemaking. Whatever the reason,
without additional resources, the Solicitor's Office will continue to be a
bottleneck.2"9
From a somewhat broader perspective, the source of the problem may
be that the Supreme Court has encouraged "searching and careful"
review on the part of the courts of appeals. 4" Since the parties usually
may shop among all of the courts of appeals for the most favorable forum,
OSHA attorneys must prepare the record under the assumption that it
will be reviewed by the least sympathetic court.24 Although an extended
discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the "hard look" doctrine
is not appropriate here,2 2 it is worth noting that the courts of appeals
should not perform their essential institutional role in a vacuum, unaware
of the consequences of intense judicial review. One of the most important
consequences from the Agency's perspective is the tendency of stringent
judicial review to constrain the Agency's rulemaking output.2 "4
D. Implementation of Patch and Repair Reform
If OSHA is serious about increasing its ponderous standard-setting
pace, it should implement a priority-setting system, rely more heavily
upon generic approaches to standard-setting, choose methods of regulation
that minimize conflict between interested parties and the Agency, and
adopt more efficient approaches to its hearings. To maximize the potential
of these reforms, OSHA should take two additional steps: seek additional
resources and adopt a regulatory plan.
The Reagan administration budget cuts have left OSHA, and particu-
238. Id.
239. See infra notes 243-44 and accompanying text (discussion of current underfunding of
OSHA).
240. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text; McGarity, Beyond the Hard Look: A New
Standard for Judicial Review?, 2 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 32 (1986) [hereinafter McGarity, Be-
yond the Hard Look]; McGarity, Judicial Review of Scientific Rulemaking, 9 Sci. TECH. & HuM.
VALUES 97 (1984).
241. See McGarity, Multi-Party Forum Shopping for Appellate Review of Administrative Action,
129 U. PA. L. REV. 302 (1980).
242. See Shapiro & Glicksman, Congress, The Supreme Court and the Quiet Revolution in Ad-
ministrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming manuscript on file with authors) (discussing advan-
tages and disadvantages of hard look doctrine); McGarity, Beyond the Hard Look, supra note 240
(criticizing "hard look" review and advocating "pass-fail professor" test to replace it).
243. For a possible remedy, see infra note 286 and accompanying text.
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larly the Health Standards Directorate, seriously understaffed. 244 Individ-
ual health professionals in that Directorate are responsible for multiple
rulemaking projects and have numerous additional responsibilities. "4 ' In
addition, OSHA badly needs an infusion of new personnel.246 Creating
new positions in the Health Standards Directorate would allow the
Agency to hire new professionals and take on additional tasks. It is, in the
final analysis, hypocritical for Congress and OMB to criticize OSHA for
poor work if they are unwilling to provide sufficient resources for the
Agency to do a good job.
Whether or not it receives additional resources, OSHA should establish
a committee to draft a regulatory plan setting out the Agency's agenda for
the foreseeable future.2 47 The plan could be most useful in identifying
areas where the Agency should adopt generic approaches toward regulat-
ing hazards on the priority list."" For example, if a generic standard for
the petroleum industry would effectively regulate eighty percent of the use
of the chemicals ranked third, fourth, and eighteenth on the priority list,
the plan might require OSHA to initiate a generic rulemaking proceeding
immediately and forestall promulgating individual standards for chemicals
ranked third and fourth. The plan could also initially examine whether a
consensus approach 49 or use of a performance or information standard
would be appropriate for particular initiatives.2 50 A regulatory plan
244. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (describing Reagan budget cuts).
245. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
246. Many of OSHA's health scientists and industrial hygienists have been with the Agency since
the early 1970s, and a few are approaching retirement age. Although most are enthusiastic about their
jobs, they have "been around the block" a few times and sometimes lack commitment to the Agency's
worker protection goals. An infusion of new talent could have the effect of reinvigorating some of the
long-term employees.
247. The plan could be developed for the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health
by the priority-setting committee recommended earlier, see supra notes 127-35 and accompanying
text, or by a specific committee appointed for this purpose. Use of the priority-setting committee
would integrate the functions of priority-setting and regulatory planning, but the members of the
priority-setting committee may not have the relevant expertise for regulatory planning. For example,
the priority-setting committee may have to have representatives from the Solicitor's Office or the
Agency's budget office. If a separate committee is used, it could be composed of high-level manage-
ment staffers from at least the deputy director level, a lawyer from the Solicitor's Office, and profes-
sionals from the Directorates of Health Standards, Safety Standards, and Policy. Coordination
between the priority-setting and regulatory planning committees would be facilitated if one or two
persons were members of both committees.
248. See supra notes 159-76 and accompanying text.
249. For example, if the Agency lacks sufficient resources to convene a scientific advisory commit-
tee for every hazard on its priority list, it could use the plan to designate those hazards for which a
committee would be used. See supra notes 127-35 and accompanying text (discussing advisory com-
mittees). Similarly, the plan could be a vehicle for identifying at an early stage potential candidates for
negotiated rulemaking. See supra notes 189-96 and accompanying text (discussing negotiated
rulemaking).
250. See supra notes 212-24 and accompanying text (discussing performance and information
oriented standards). This aspect of the regulatory plan would be less useful than its other advantages,
however, because performance and information options are more likely to arise in the standard setting
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would give OSHA a clearer picture of the Agency's near-term goals, al-
low the Agency to match resources with its priorities list, and give some
signal to the public and to OSHA's staff about how the Agency intends to
meet its goals. Finally, this planning process should fold neatly into
OSHA's existing program to comply with Executive Order 12,498,251
which requires the Agency to submit an annual report to OMB identify-
ing its regulatory program.
The committee's first drafting of a plan would be quite burdensome
and no doubt controversial. Holding one or more public meetings is possi-
ble to aid the committee in this initial task.252 All committee members
would attend such meetings, at which interested persons would be invited
to comment on methods of regulation and their relationship to OSHA's
priorities. The regulatory planning committee should make public the
results of these meetings after the Assistant Secretary has had an opportu-
nity to review any proposed decisions of the committee. Because outside
parties may have information that is important to the Agency's plan, the
committee should invite public comment on its work and be open to
changing the plan in light of the comments. The Agency, however, must
take the position that its statutory mandate does not require the use of
informal rulemaking procedures,2 58 and it should resist strongly any judi-
cial review of the plan. 54 If the Agency is forced to litigate the value of
the plan, or any amendment of it, the attendant delays could defeat the
purpose of the entire exercise.
III. Fundamental Legislative Solutions That Congress Should Adopt
The reforms suggested above can increase OSHA's productivity, but
they have significant limitations. Updating the 1971 consensus standards
presents a tangle of legal and practical problems and may provide only
marginal additional protection for workers. In many situations, formula-
process when the Agency has more information concerning the costs and benefits of several options.
251. Executive Order 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (1985), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. IV
1986). Executive Order 12,498 establishes a government-wide regulatory planning process, the pur-
pose of which is to aid presidential oversight, reduce the burden of regulation, minimize duplication
and conflict, and enhance public understanding of regulations. Each agency is required to assemble an
annual regulatory program and send it to the OMB for approval. The regulatory program must
contain a statement of the agency's regulatory goals for the year and information concerning all signif-
icant regulatory actions underway or planned for the year. If the agency fails to include an action in
its regulatory program, it may not initiate that action during the year, absent an emergency or statu-
tory or judicial deadlines.
252. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing use of public workshops to comment
on priorities list).
253. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing why OSHA need not use rulemaking
procedures for adoption of priorities list).
254. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text (discussing why judicial review of priorities
list is not required).
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tion of generic, performance, or information standards is not possible and
will not protect workers as effectively as OSHA's traditional standard-
setting approaches. Negotiated rulemaking and advisory committees prob-
ably will not work for very many of the problems that OSHA must
address. Improving the hearing process is unlikely to decrease substan-
tially the time it takes promulgate a standard. Thus, comprehensive re-
forms can come about only through legislative change.
Congress should act not only because the potential for internal reform is
limited, but also because the current statute is the cause of many of
OSHA's problems. Congress has given OSHA less flexibility than most
other health and safety agencies, has failed to hold OSHA as accountable
as other agencies, and has created unique organizational impediments to
effective action by OSHA. Without legislative change, it is highly likely
that OSHA will continue to regulate at its current slow pace, imposing
extensive requirements on a few industries while leaving most workers
without adequate protections.
Congress can adopt three relatively moderate solutions that should
improve OSHA's limited productivity without radically altering the na-
ture of government regulation of workplace risks. It can provide a more
flexible mandate, impose more appropriate time deadlines, and bring
about a reorganization of NIOSH and OSHRC. Congress has available
more profound solutions, such as governmentally induced "industrial de-
mocracy," that deserve further attention,"5 but the probability that Con-
gress will consider relatively radical reforms at this juncture is sufficiently
low that this Article will not discuss them.
A. A More Flexible Mandate
OSHA badly needs a more flexible mandate within which to exercise
its discretion. Congress can create such a mandate by amending the sub-
stantive criteria for standard-setting and by clarifying the scope of judicial
review.
1. A Realistic Legal Mandate
OSHA's most ambitious effort to increase its regulatory productiv-
ity-its generic cancer policy250-came to a grinding halt in 1980 when
255. C. NOBLE, supra note 183 at 235-44 (1986); B. JUDKINS, WE OFFER OURSELVES AS Evi-
DENCE: TOWARD WORKERS' CONTROL OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH 204-05 (1986).
256. Identificaton, Classification, and Regulation of Potential Occupational Carcinogens, 29
C.F.R. § 1990 (1987). This approach adopted "fill-in-the-blank" standards for carcinogens. For
example, exposure levels for substances that caused an increased incidence of tumors in two species, or
in two experiments in a single species, would presumptively have been set at the lowest feasible level.
In addition, there would have been monitoring, surveillance, and housekeeping requirements for such
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the Supreme Court handed down its remarkable plurality opinion in the
Benzene case.257 The immediate effect of the decision was to end OSHA's
generic cancer policy.258 Over the long term, the Court's significant risk
test has been a significant impediment to effective implementation of
OSHA's statutory mandate. Having imposed the test on an unsuspecting
OSHA, the Court failed to give coherent guidance as to the meaning of
the term.259 As a result, OSHA may not act to protect workers until it has
accumulated substantial evidence that a chemical is dangerous;260 more-
over, it often hesitates to act out of fear of judicial reversal even when it
may have sufficient evidence to do so.26'
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, OSHA's mandate is considerably
less flexible than EPA's mandate under the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act 2 2 and the Clean Air Act.26 Congress amended those acts when it
became clear that EPA could not regulate effectively under the prior legis-
lative constraints. Congress could increase OSHA's productivity by estab-
lishing mandates similar to those that now constrain EPA.2"4
chemicals. At the rulemaking hearing, the issues would have been limited to whether (1) the substance
was correctly identified as a carcinogen; (2) the presumption about the level of exposure had been
successfully rebutted; (3) the exposure level was feasible; (4) the substance had unique properties that
would make protective measures required by the cancer policy inappropriate or infeasible; and (5) the
environmental impact of the regulation was correctly identified. OSHA hoped that this generic
approach to regulating potential occupational carcinogens would have substantially increased its
rulemaking output. See McGarity, supra note 228.
257. Benzene, 448 U.S. 607 (1980). Juxtaposing the definition of standard in § 3(8) of the Act
against the specific requirement of § 6(b)(5) that OSHA should "to the extent feasible" set standards
that protect workers for their entire lives from risks of material impairment, the plurality opinion
found that OSHA had an affirmative burden to prove that an occupational health standard was neces-
sary to reduce a "significant risk" in the workplace. 448 U.S. at 639. The four dissenting justices
found no mention of the words "significant risk" in the statute and accused the plurality of intruding
into the Agency's legitimate policymaking domain. 448 U.S. at 688 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
258. See, e.g., Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 17, at 1261-62.
259. Justice Stevens, the author of the plurality opinion, suggested that a one-in-a-billion
probability of contracting cancer from a drink of chlorinated water is "insignificant," while a one-in-
a-thousand probability of contracting cancer from breathing benzene in gasoline vapors would be
"significant." Benzene, 448 U.S. at 655. Justice Stevens did not understand, however, that both the
probability of contracting a disease and the number of persons at risk must be considered. See RISK
ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 23, at 18. If the number of persons are
taken into consideration, about 365 persons will contract cancer from drinking water according to
Justice Stevens' hypothetically insignificant risk. (Assumes 200 million Americans, each of whom
drinks five glasses of water per day, with a probability of contracting cancer of one-in-one-billion.)
Again, taking the number of persons into account, about 400 persons will contract cancer from breath-
ing benzene from gasoline vapors. (Assumes 2,000 gasoline stations, each with two attendants who are
exposed to benzene 365 days a year, with a probability of contracting cancer of one-in-one-thousand.)
Yet, Justice Stevens assures us that the former risk is insignificant, while the latter is significant.
260. Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 17, at 1256-64.
261. See supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text (arguing that OSHA lawyers refuse to pro-
mulgate rule until all possible evidentiary defects are eliminated).
262. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
263. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982).
264. When EPA encountered difficulties implementing its mandate under § 307(a) of the Clean
Water Act to promulgate standards sufficing to "protect the public health" with an "ample margin of
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Congress could incorporate its experience in the environmental area
into a regulatory mandate for OSHA by adopting a regulatory scheme
that requires OSHA to establish a list of chemicals and other substances
that "could reasonably be anticipated to cause a material impairment of
health or functional capacity."2 5 The scheme would presume that any
chemical substance on the list was a Class II hazard unless OSHA
redesignated it as Class I or III. For all Class II hazards, OSHA would
promulgate standards requiring the installation of the "best available
technology" (BAT).266
OSHA would redesignate a chemical or substance if it would be inap-
propriate to treat it as a Class II hazard. The proposal would require
OSHA to redesignate the hazard to a more stringently regulated category
(Class I) if regulation under Class II would leave workers exposed to a
"significant risk of material impairment to health or functional capacity."
For Class I hazards, OSHA would reduce exposure to the extent "feasi-
ble." This would mean applying the stringent technology-based test that
OSHA currently uses to require exposure reductions in workplaces posing
safety," Congress amended the act to empower EPA to require the installation of best available tech-
nology for controlling toxic pollutants. 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(2)(A) (1982). EPA retained its authority
to regulate under the "ample margin of safety standard," but it has relied almost exclusively on
technology-based effluent limitations for pollution control. Latin, Ideal Versus Regulatory Efficiency:
Implementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV.
1267, 1309 (1985). Rather than searching for safe levels of toxic pollutants and identifying ample
margins of safety, EPA could simply look for top-of-the-line pollution control technologies in the same
or similar industries. Similarly, the courts held that EPA was required to promulgate regulations
capable of preventing significant deterioration of "clean air" areas, Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344
F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the decision
without opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court failed to overturn it by a 4-4 vote. Fri v. Sierra Club,
412 U.S. 541 (1973). Congress once again allowed EPA to require that major emitting facilities
install "best available control technology." 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (1982). In addition, Congress es-
tablished a classification scheme under which maximum allowable increases in ambient levels of two
pollutants would vary, depending upon how the states classified particular clean air areas. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7473 (1982). Congress itself set the maximum allowable increases for particulates and sulfur diox-
ide. 42 U.S.C. § 7473(b) (1982). It ordered EPA to establish maximum allowable increases for each
class for other pollutants. 42 U.S.C. § 7476 (1982). Congress, however, established the initial classifi-
cations for all areas, some of which could be upgraded, but not downgraded by the states.
265. These words would signal Congress' intent to mandate a lower threshold than "significant
risk" for including a substance or hazard on the list. Thus, OSHA would be required to place a
chemical or hazard on the list even if it lacked sufficient information to assess its risk with a high
degree of accuracy. Congress could even specify that the list contain at least those chemicals considered
to be carcinogens or suspected carcinogens by outside expert bodies, such as the National Cancer
Institute. U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 182-83 (1987) (NCI pub-
lishes annual list of known and suspected carcinogens).
266. The term "best available technology" would be defined by reference to the best technology
actually being used within industry, technologies that could relatively easily be transferred from
industries presenting similar hazards, and pilot plant technologies that OSHA could demonstrate are
available for use in new and existing workplaces. OSHA could take the position that if the prescribed
technology did not meet OSHA's predicted PEL in a particular workplace after having been installed,
then the PEL would be based on the level that the technology did consistently reach.
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a significant risk.26 OSHA would redesignate a hazard to a less strin-
gently regulated category (Class III) if regulation under Class II was
unnecessary to avoid a "reasonable anticipation of material impairment of
health or functional capacity." For Class III hazards, OSHA would
reduce exposure to the extent permitted by any applicable nongovernmen-
tal standard, which would connote the consensus test that OSHA used to
adopt its original health standards."0 8 Table 1 is a diagram of this risk-
management scheme.
Table 1
CLASS DEFINITION REGULATORY LEVEL
I Regulation as Class II Extent permitted
presents a significant as feasible
risk of material
impairment
II Any hazard on list Extent permitted
presumed to be in by Best Available
this class unless Technology
redesignated
III Regulation as Class II Extent permitted
unnecessary to prevent by nongovernmental
a reasonable anticipation consensus standard
of material impairment.
The procedures for regulation under the suggested mandate would not
differ greatly from the existing process. OSHA would issue an announce-
ment of a proposed rulemaking that would include the classification of the
hazard. Interested persons could file comments and otherwise participate
in the existing process, except that they could now raise two additional
types of objections. First, they could object that the chemical being regu-
lated could not reasonably be anticipated to cause a material impairment
of health or functional capacity, even if exposures would exceed those per-
mitted under a Class III classification. Second, they could propose a clas-
sification different than Class II. For either or both objections, they could
submit evidence to support their arguments. After OSHA issued a final
health standard, any interested party could seek judicial review as at pre-
267. See Benzene, 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (OSHA may regulate chemicals that pose "significant
risk" to extent feasible); Society of Plastics Indus. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975) (stringent
test for "feasibility").
268. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (OSHA adopted consensus health standards as its
own regulations when it was formed).
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sent. Under the new mandate, a reviewing court would consider whether
the class of regulation chosen and technology prescribed by OSHA was
arbitrary and capricious, in light of the evidence and policy judgments
relied upon by the Agency and the evidence and arguments submitted by
interested parties.
Although the proposed classification scheme should increase the protec-
tion available to workers,269 workers may object that the proposal weak-
ens the substantive principle, established by the existing statute, that
workers are entitled to be protected to the extent "feasible."27 This
asserted right, however, was substantially diluted by the Benzene decision,
which held that workers are entitled to maximum protection only if
OSHA can first prove that a hazard presents a "significant risk." '' The
reality is that in many cases either OSHA cannot meet that burden of
proof or it takes so long to do so that it cannot regulate more than one or
two hazards a year."' Internal reforms are unlikely to accelerate greatly
OSHA's productivity.27 3 Any given worker might be protected by stan-
dards somewhat less stringent under the proposed regime than under the
existing regime, but the new approach should protect many more workers
than the current scheme. 7 4
Employers are likely to object that the proposed scheme gives OSHA
too much discretion to promulgate regulations whose costs exceed their
269. In cases where there is sufficient information to justify the strictest level of regulation (Class
I regulation), the proposal operates in the same manner as the existing act. Workers are entitled to a
reduction in risk to the level of feasibility. See supra note 259 and accompanying text (hazards posing
significant risk are regulated under feasibility standard). In cases where there is insufficient informa-
tion to justify that level of protection, however, OSHA will still have to regulate, although somewhat
less stringently.
270. See supra note 259 and accompanying text (workers entitled to be protected from "signifi-
cant risks" to the extent feasible). Workers may also object that the proposal can shift the burden of
justifying the level of regulation to them. If OSHA proposes that a chemical remain designated as
Class II, workers could ask that it be redesignated as Class I. If OSHA disagrees, however, workers
would have to demonstrate that OSHA's classification was arbitrary and capricious. Yet workers are
in no better position under the existing act when they disagree with OSHA about the proper level of
regulation. If OSHA proposes a less strict exposure than that preferred by workers, they can file
comments supporting a stricter limitation, but OSHA will be upheld if it has substantial evidence for
its position.
271. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
273. See supra Part II.
274. Congress could offer workers additional protection by specifying standardized protections
that would be applicable to each class of chemicals, or it could require OSHA to do so in a generic
rulemaking proceeding. When OSHA currently promulgates a health standard, it not only establishes
a PEL, but it also requires protections such as exposure monitoring, medical surveillance and others.
See M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 153, §§ 71-72 (1983) (discussion of other protections required by
OSHA). OSHA could promulgate generic standards for such protections and then incorporate them
into individual proposals for health standards. Interested parties could file comments concerning the
application of any of the generic requirements in a specific case. If OSHA were to be persuaded, it
could grant variances as appropriate, which would be subject to judicial review.
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benefits.275 There are at least three responses to this objection. First,
unless OSHA's burden of proof is adjusted, it cannot protect workers in
the manner Congress intended.276 Second, in cases where OSHA has a
lower burden of proof, it has regulatory authority only to impose regula-
tory requirements that are likely to be less costly.2 77 Finally, when OSHA
proposes an inappropriate regulation, employers can reduce compliance
costs by proving that a lower classification is appropriate.278
2. An Appropriate Scope of Review
Much of the good that might be accomplished by giving OSHA a more
flexible mandate could easily be undone by a judiciary unwilling to give
OSHA the proper degree of deference. Most regulatory agencies have suf-
fered from over-intrusive judicial review,2 79 and OSHA is no exception.
275. OSHA's existing authority has been criticized because it permits the Agency to regulate
without proving that the benefits of a rule are reasonably related to its costs. See, e.g., J. MENDELOFF,
REGULATING SAFETY: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH 61-71 (1980). The proposed scheme is subject to the same objection. Employers are pro-
tected to the extent that OSHA must prove a significant risk before it can regulate under Class I. Yet
employers will no doubt still argue that OSHA should not be allowed to promulgate less stringent
BAT standards where there is only a "reasonable anticipation" that workers are endangered.
276. "[T]he practical consequence of making particularized risk estimates legally relevant-indeed
mandatory-is to emasculate the regulation of carcinogens under prevailing conditions of scientific
uncertainty." Latin, supra note 264, at 1329.
277. If there is only a reasonable anticipation of harm, OSHA can require the reduction of expo-
sure only to the level of BAT, and not to the level of feasibility. Moreover, Congress could require
that firms in an industry should be capable of installing BAT without causing prices to rise so high as
to cause significant (perhaps 10%) substitution for other products from a different industry. Finally,
OSHA should be given the authority to require a specific technology or to set a PEL based on a
technology and allow individual firms to meet the PEL with whatever technology would do the job.
This flexibility would allow OSHA to avoid lengthy debates about whether a particular technology
can meet a particular PEL in a particular workplace before the standard goes into effect, and it
should give industry the flexibility to adopt the less costly technology that will meet the PEL. See
supra notes 197-211 and accompanying text (OSHA should adopt performance standards whenever
they offer same degree of protection to workers as design standards).
278. Employers will probably also argue that, under the Benzene decision, a "significant risk" test
is constitutionally compelled. In Benzene, the plurality justified their statutory interpretation on the
ground that OSHA's interpretation would violate the nondelegation doctrine. 448 U.S. at 646. This
objection, however, does not apply to the proposed scheme for two reasons. First, the plurality worried
that under its interpretation, OSHA would have "unprecedented power." 448 U.S. at 645. The pro-
posal, however, is modeled on the powers that Congress has given to EPA. See supra note 264 and
accompanying text (Congress authorized EPA to use classification system based on BAT). Second,
because the proposal requires proof of significant risk if OSHA reduces a hazard to the point of
feasibility, it is consistent with the Benzene decision.
279. E.g., Mashaw & Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety,
4 YALE J. ON REG. 257 (1987) (National Highway Traffic Safety Agency attempts to promulgate
rules have been emasculated by judicial review); Ashford, Ryan & Caldart, Law and Science Policy
In Federal Regulation of Formaldehyde, 222 SCIENCE 40, 45-46 (1983) (court that decided Gulf S.
Insulation v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 701 F.2d 1137 (3d Cir. 1983), "substituted its judg-
ment for that of the agency concerning whether formaldehyde is a human carcinogen."); see also
McGarity, Resolution of Science Policy Questions, supra note 8, at 796 (courts fail to give agency
policy decisions deference).
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An example is Forging Industries Association v. Secretary of Labor,2 80
where the issue was the legality of OSHA's 1983 hearing conservation
amendment that ordered employers to test employees exposed to loud
noises and to prevent further hearing loss if the employees had been
adversely affected.281 The court, in a two-to-one decision, held that OSHA
had exceeded its statutory authority because it required employers to take
preventive actions even if an employee suffered a hearing loss due to a
nonoccupational cause. Although the panel's decision was subsequently
overruled by the Fourth Circuit sitting en banc,28 2 it illustrates that courts
sometimes fail to defer to OSHA's policy decisions, and that even if cor-
rected, such decisions can consume enormous quantities of Agency
resources.
In reaching its result, the original Fourth Circuit panel majority paid
no attention to OSHA's justification for the amendment.2"' OSHA made a
specific finding that most hearing losses would be work-related.284 More
important, OSHA determined as a policy matter that even if an injury
was not work-related, an employer should be required to take preventative
actions to avoid a high risk of further injury in the workplace. OSHA
found that once a person suffers a hearing injury, the person is more sus-
ceptible to further hearing injury than others who have been exposed to
loud noises without being injured.285 By ignoring this finding, the court
gave OSHA's policy judgment no deference whatsoever. It is hard to avoid
the conclusion that the prospect of judicial review by a panel like the one
that wrote the Forging Industries opinion has a major impact on the
speed with which OSHA promulgates occupational health and safety
standards.28
280. 748 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1984), rev'd en banc, 773 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1985).
281. 748 F.2d at 212-213.
282. Forging Indus. Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 773 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
283. 748 F.2d at 214. The exact basis of the panel's decision is obscure. Judge Sprouse's dissent
understood the majority to have concluded that even if workers were likely to be injured on the job,
OSHA could not act because a hearing loss could be aggravated by nonwork related causes. As the
dissent observed, this conclusion is not only illogical, but also it would prevent OSHA from regulating
any hazard the health effects of which could be aggravated by other factors. 748 F.2d at 216 (Sprouse,
J., dissenting). There are many negative physiological effects for which the precise cause cannot be
determined, but which are known to be associated with occupational exposure. See Schroeder & Sha-
piro, supra note 17, at 1236. An example is reproductive hazards, where most negative reproductive
outcomes are of unknown origin even though certain workplace exposures have been proven to have
adverse effects on reproduction. See M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 153, § 66 (1988 Supp.). If adopted
by other courts, this rationale would have effectively emasculated the Agency.
284. 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (1987). "[S]ince this amendment covers workers who are occupationally
exposed to significant amounts of noise, the occupational loss can be expected to be the dominating
component in most cases. Even though people may hunt or engage in noisy hobbies, most [injuries]
will be work-related because the average person spends more time on a routine basis at work than in
recreational activities." Id.
285. Id.
286. See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text (prospect of stringent judicial review slows
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The judiciary has been sending contradictory signals to OSHA. At the
behest of unions and public interest groups, courts have on numerous
occasions ordered OSHA to proceed with rulemaking at a faster pace. Yet
after the Agency has struggled through an expedited rulemaking initiative,
the reviewing courts (which in many cases are the very courts that ordered
the Agency to expedite things) remand portions of the rule under the rela-
tively stringent hard-look doctrine.2"'
Decisions like Forging Industries have led to a fair degree of consensus
in the legal community that the current standards for judicial review of
administrative action require clarification.2"' The Administrative Law
Section of the American Bar Association adopted a "Restatement of the
Scope-of-Review Doctrine"2 9 that improves the APA and OSHA's ena-
bling act, by listing the types of legal, policy, and factual conclusions that
agencies typically reach in informal rulemaking and indicating what scope
of review is to be applied to each. Agency "policy judgments" are subject
to a standard of "arbitrariness"; the factual premises upon which they are
based are subject to a standard of "substantial support in the administra-
tive record viewed as a whole."'2 90
At best, existing scope-of-review statutes confuse unwary judges, and at
worst, invite judicial overreaching. To mitigate the tendency of strict judi-
cial review to emasculate aggressive administrative implementation of stat-
utory mandates, Congress should enact amendments to OSHA's enabling
act, or even better, to the APA, based on the ABA's Restatement of the
Scope-of-Review Doctrine. Congress should express its dissatisfaction
with cases like Forging Industries that give very little or no deference to
Agency policy judgments and attempt to substitute the opinions of judges
for the policy judgment of the agencies to whom Congress delegated poli-
cymaking functions.
OSHA's decisionmaking).
287. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 69-70 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (MacKinnon, J., dissent-
ing) (observing that court order to EPA to promulgate regulation within 30 days resulted in "the
flawed regulation which we now review"). See generally R. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE
COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (1983).
288. The Administrative Conference of the United States has recommended that Congress not
utilize the "substantial evidence" standard for informal rulemaking. Preenforcement Judicial Review
of Rules of General Applicability (Recommendation 74-4), 1 C.F.R. § 305.74-4 (1988).
289. Am. Bar Ass'n Admin. Law Section, Restatement of the Scope of Review Doctrine, 38 AD-
MIN. L. REV. 235-37 (1986). The Restatement is based on a report written by Professor Ronald
Levin. See Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Section Report, 38
ADMIN. L. REV. 239 (1986). Preliminary drafts of the report were widely circulated within the Sec-
tion of Administrative Law and the broader administrative law community, including members of the
Administrative Conference. Id.
290. Id. at 242-90.
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B. More Appropriate Time Deadlines
OSHA is not the only agency to encounter difficulty in completing
rulemaking initiatives within a reasonable period of time. When Congress
wanted to motivate EPA to act more expeditiously, it assigned statutory
deadlines within which the Agency is required to complete its tasks. 9 '
Taking the EPA experience into account, Congress should establish more
appropriate time deadlines for OSHA.
Statutory deadlines can improve legislative oversight,292 provide a signal
to an agency which decisions are most important to Congress,29 enable
courts to determine more easily when agency action is unreasonably
delayed in violation of the APA, 94 and mitigate various pressuees on an
agency to act slowly. 9 Unfortunately, these advantages are often lost be-
cause of the agency's limited resources,296 and because Congress sets dead-
lines that are unrealistically short.2 97 If the agency ignores the deadlines,
scarce resources flow to litigation over the deadlines, rather than to more
291. See Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 242, manuscript at 16-17 (Congress has set numerous
deadlines at EPA to speed its regulatory efforts).
292. Ogden, Reducing Administrative Delay: Timeliness Standards, Judicial Review of Agency
Procedures, Procedural Reform, and Legislative Oversight, 4 U. DAYTON L. REV. 71, 85 (1979)
("Legislative imposition of standards for timeliness . . . indicates the legislature's commitment to
timely agency decisionmaking."). Missed deadlines generate public concern and thereby focus congres-
sional attention on deadlines. ENVTL. AND ENERGY STUDY INST., STATUTORY DEADLINES IN ENVI-
RONMENTAL LEGISLATION: NECESSARY BUT NEEDED IMPROVEMENT 33 (1985). Moreover, a statu-
tory deadline provides a clear, articulable standard easily used by oversight committees at agency and
budget review time. Ogden, supra.
293. ENVTL. AND ENERGY STUDY INST., supra note 292, at 41.
294. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(a)(1) (1982) (authorizing courts to "compel agency action ... unreasona-
bly delayed"); see also Tomlinson, supra note 200, at 138 (statutory deadlines provide clear standard
for measuring "unreasonable delay" and shift burden to agency to explain why it has not fulfilled
Congress' expectations).
295. Deadlines mitigate political pressures to slow agency decisionmaking, ENVTL. AND ENERGY
STUDY INST., supra note 292, at ii, including pressure from OMB, id. at 27. Deadlines also give
agencies a reason to end otherwise interminable analysis of incomplete information, and compel agen-
cies to reach difficult, but necessary decisions. Without deadlines, agencies tend to delay difficult deci-
sions in the hope that additional evidence will be forthcoming or the necessity for a decision will
disappear. Id. at 30-31.
296. Tomlinson, supra note 200, at 122 (Congress sets inappropriate deadlines because it fails to
appreciate that proceedings of different degrees of complexity require different deadlines), Abbott, The
Case Against Federal Statutory and Judicial Deadlines: A Cost-Benefit Appraisal, 39 ADMIN. L.
REV. 171, 182 (1987) (Congress is insensitive to agency resources when it sets deadlines); SENATE
COMM. ON GOV'T AFFAIRS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATIONS: DELAY IN THE REGULATORY
PROCESS, PART IV, S. Doc. No. 72, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 147 (1977) [hereinafter SENATE COMM.
ON GOV'T. AFFAIRS] (Congress sets inappropriate deadlines because it is unfamiliar with details of
regulatory process); see ENVTL. AND ENERGY STUDY INST., supra note 292, at 12 (EPA has met few
deadlines imposed on it).
297. See, e.g., Graham, The Failure of Agency-Forcing: The Regulation of Airborne Carcinogens
Under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 1985 DUKE L.J. 100, 123 (deadlines requiring EPA to
regulate hazardous air pollutants are "ludicrous"). When an agency is unable to comply with its
deadlines, it ends up making undesirable trade-offs in its decisionmaking.
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worthwhile substantive projects,2"' thereby undermining public confidence
in the agency.299
Critics argue that OSHA's experience with deadlines confirms that they
create serious problems."' The few deadlines in OSHA's current statute
are, in fact, inappropriate. They are generally too strict and apply to the
wrong activities. Indeed, the deadlines for advisory committees have prob-
ably played a large role in OSHA's virtual abandonment of that pro-
cess."' The fact that deadlines are inappropriate for some purposes does
not imply that they will not enhance OSHA decisionmaking in other
contexts.
Strategically placed statutory deadlines can have two salutary effects on
OSHA d'ecisionmaking. First, they should improve legislative oversight. If
deadlines are not met, Congress can require Agency management to
explain what problems are impeding their progress. Deadlines should
prompt Agency management to emphasize the alternative regulatory
approaches discussed earlier. If the Agency could not comply with the
deadlines even after it used those alternatives, Congress would have ample
evidence that OSHA's enabling act should be further amended. Finally,
deadlines would assist OSHA in seeking an appropriate level of resources.
In oversight and appropriation hearings, OSHA would have the opportu-
nity to demonstrate the level of resources necessary to meet applicable
deadlines. Even if OMB did not allow OSHA to seek additional
resources, deadlines would be useful in alerting Congress to the possibility
that OMB budget oversight had resulted in underfunding.
Second, without legislative guidance, the courts have floundered in try-
ing to determine what constitutes unreasonable delay. A good example of
this problem is the interaction between the courts and OSHA concerning
the field sanitation standard. Although OSHA has required employers to
provide drinking water, toilets, and hand-washing facilities for most work-
298. E.g., id. at 124-27 (EPA's fruitless attempt to comply with deadlines for regulating hazard-
ous air pollutants diverted resources from development of emission standards for new sources); see
ENVTL. AND ENERGY STUDY INST., supra note 292, at 44. Alternatively, the Agency may take action
in such haste that it will not withstand judicial review. H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt.
1, at 56, 71 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2835. Strict time limits
also make it difficult for the Agency to obtain input from OMB and the public. Abbott, supra note
296, at 196.
299. ENVTL. AND ENERGY STUDY INST., supra note 292, at 48.
300. See, e.g., Tomlinson, supra note 200, at 201-03 (OSHA deadlines are unrealistic, do not
apply to stages of rulemaking process that are most important causes of delay, and have forced OSHA
to concentrate its resources on proceedings subject to deadlines). Two of OSHA's deadlines concern
the use of advisory committees. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text (describing deadlines
applying to advisory committees). Another deadline applies to emergency standards. 29 U.S.C. §
655(c)(3) (1982) (OSHA must promulgate permanent standard within six months of issuing emer-
gency standard).
301. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
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ers since 1971, the standard did not apply to farmworkers until 1987.302
In 1972, El Congresso, an organization representing Hispanic Americans,
petitioned OSHA to eliminate the exemption. 303 The fourteen years of
litigation that followed are a dreadful example of administrative foot-
dragging and judicial delay, and clearly demonstrate the problems of
unclear legislative direction.
In 1973, El Congresso sued OSHA for its failure to act on its petition,
and in 1977 the D.C. Circuit reversed a district court order requiring
OSHA to propose a standard.3 'O When OSHA failed to comply with the
circuit court's order that it submit a timetable for the completion of the
standard, the district court ordered the Agency to issue the standard "as
soon as possible."' ' The D.C. Circuit, however, reversed that order in
1979 and again required OSHA to submit a timetable.306 In 1982, OSHA
agreed to issue a standard by February of 1985,3"7 but in January of
1985, it reneged on that commitment, which caused the court to order
OSHA to complete the standard. 0 OSHA replied that it would instead
wait two years to determine if the states developed their own standards. 0 9
The D.C. Circuit reacted to this Agency statement by ordering OSHA to
issue a standard within thirty days. 10 Although Secretary Brock described
the court's order as a "jackass decision,"3"' he complied, and the standard
was issued fourteen and one-half years after El Congresso's petition was
filed.312
Appropriate statutory deadlines hold out some promise of assisting judi-
cial efforts to end unreasonable delay of the kind that El Congresso exper-
ienced."1 Without a legislative deadline, courts are reluctant to overrrule
an agency's proposed timetable, even if it appears to be dilatory.3" With a
302. See Field Sanitation, 52 Fed. Reg. 16,050 (1987).
303. See Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc. v. Brock, 811 F.2d 613, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
304. National Congress of Hispanic Am. Citizens v. Usery, 554 F.2d 1196 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The
district court's order was reversed on the ground that courts ought to preserve "agency discretion to
alter priorities and defer action due to legitimate statutory considerations." 544 F.2d at 1200.
305. Memorandum Opinion at 5 (Dec. 26, 1978), quoted in National Congress of Hispanic Am.
Citizens v. Marshall, 626 F.2d 882, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
306. National Congress of Hispanic Am. Citizens v. Marshall, 626 F.2d 882, 890 (D.C. Cir.
1979). The court reversed the district court on the ground that OSHA had reasonably exercised its
discretion in postponing the standard in order to confront more pressing business. 626 F.2d at 889.
307. See Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc. v. Brock, 811 F.2d 613, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
308. 811 F.2d at 633.
309. Agriculture Health and Safety Standards, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,660-42,662 (1985).
310. Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc. v. Brock, 811 F.2d at 631-33.
311. O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1179 (Apr. 8, 1987).
312. 29 C.F.R. § 1928 (1987).
313. See Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 242, manuscript at 28 (analyzing effect of statutory
deadlines on court enforcement of APA's prohibition of unreasonable delay).
314. Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Zegeer, 768 F.2d 1480, 1487-88 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (refusing to order Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) to expedite rulemaking to
protect underground miners from radon gas, in light of complex scientific and technical issues in-
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legislative deadline, the courts have some congressional guidance in evalu-
ating the Agency's excuses for delay.3" 5 Moreover, though statutory dead-
lines may not result in strict compliance, they permit a court to insist on
more timely compliance than it might otherwise feel comfortable enforc-
ing. Perhaps most important, deadlines give beneficiaries leverage to
ensure that a lethargic or reluctant agency does not attempt to avoid its
sometimes controversial rulemaking responsibilities by failing to face
tough issues.
Most of the disadvantages of statutory deadlines can be successfully
minimized. Some diversion of Agency resources to bureaucracy-forcing
lawsuits may be a necessary cost of holding the Agency accountable. Bene-
ficiary groups contend that past OSHA administrators have refused to
decide difficult controversies until they were required to by a court or-
der." 6 The field sanitation saga supports this allegation. 1  Finally, if the
Agency establishes an effective priority-setting process, it should be better
able to cope with deadlines and resulting litigation.
Realistic deadlines would provide regulatory beneficiaries with a tool to
prod a sometimes reluctant OSHA to move more quickly. The deadlines,
however, must be tailored so as not to "overstimulat[e] the organism." 8"
For this reason, Congress should require OSHA to set rulemaking dead-
lines and then should make those deadlines judicially enforceable. This
would permit the Agency to set realistic deadlines," 9 while still holding
volved). The Zegeer court set forth a deferential standard of review in cases seeking to expedite
Agency action: "The difficulty and uncertainty inherent in the venture caution us against second-
guessing MSHA's judgment that its ultimate disposition will be facilitated" by ordering the Agency to
act more quickly. Id.; see, e.g., International Union, UAW v. Donovan, 756 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (affirming district court decisions to grant three extensions to OSHA beyond original commit-
ment to finish formaldehyde standard); United States Steelworkers of Am. v. Rubber Mfrs. Ass'n, 783
F.2d 117, 1119-20 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (court accepts OSHA's proposed 14-month schedule as
reasonable).
315. See, e.g., New York v. Gorsuch, 554 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (ordering EPA to
expedite issuance of proposed regulations establishing emission standards for inorganic arsenic under
§ 112 of Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1982)); Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 551 F. Supp. 785 (N.D.
Cal. 1982) (issuing order scheduling EPA issuance of proposed regulations establishing emission stan-
dards for radionuclides under same statutory provision); cf Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas,
627 F. Supp. 556 (D.D.C. 1986) (holding that OMB could not invoke its authority under Exec.
Order 12,291 to delay issuance of EPA regulations beyond deadline established in 1984 RCRA
amendments). But see Illinois v. Costle, 12 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1597 (D.D.C. 1979), affd sub.
nom. Citizens for a Better Env't. v. Costle, 617 F.2d 851 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (court of equity has little
power to enforce statutory deadlines against agencies claiming impossibility.).
316. Seminario interview, supra note 89.
317. See supra notes 302-12 and accompanying text.
318. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
319. The Administrative Conference suggests that the problem of unreasonable deadlines and
adverse effects on agency decisionmaking can be mitigated if the agency sets its own deadlines, I
C.F.R. § 305.78-3 (1987), because the deadlines reflect the agency's understanding of its own resource
limitations. See also Ogden, supra note 292, at 86; Abbott, supra note 296, at 202.
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the Agency accountable.3 0 Congress could further assure accountability
by providing that Agency-set deadlines could be extended only for good
cause and only for congressionally determined intervals. Finally, Congress
should provide for judicial review of Agency-set deadlines to prevent
OSHA from setting unreasonably long deadlines.
In addition to setting deadlines for Agency action, Congress might also
consider the use of substantive "hammers" in appropriate cases.321 Con-
gress might mandate that if OSHA did not write a standard for a listed
chemical before the deadline, the legally applicable PEL would automati-
cally be the most stringent of a national consensus standard, a NIOSH
recommendation for the chemical, or the most stringent PEL required by
any state. The hammer technique would allow Congress to make a deci-
sion and then give the Agency an opportunity to modify it. In this man-
ner, Congress could ensure not only that a controversy was resolved, but
also that it was resolved in an expeditious fashion. If the Agency did not
act, the legislative decision would take effect. If the Agency did act, Con-
gress would have forced the Agency to resolve the matter expeditiously. 22
C. Realign NIOSH and OSHRC
When Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act, it
made two choices that were nontraditional in terms of the organization of
regulatory agencies. First, it placed the scientists advising OSHA in a sep-
arate agency, NIOSH, located in another executive department, HHS.
OSHA is unique among health and safety agencies in that its research
arm is located in another agency. Second, it created a third agency,
OSHRC, to adjudicate whether an employer has violated an OSHA stan-
dard or the employer's general duty to provide a safe and healthful work-
place. Most regulatory agencies operate under the traditional model of
adjudication: the agency itself determines whether its regulations have
been violated. While both of these choices may have been justifiable at the
time Congress enacted them, experience indicates that they have created so
many problems for OSHA that they ought to be changed.
320. Agency-set deadlines would be a more effective oversight tool for the courts because they
could be used to determine what constitutes "unreasonable delay" under the APA. SENATE COMM.
ON Gov'T AFFAIRS, supra note 296, at 141, and because if agencies set their own deadlines, they
could not argue that a missed deadline was unrealistic. Abbott, supra note 296, at 201.
321. The metaphorically named "hammer" is legislation that allows an agency a certain period of
time to regulate; if at the end of that time it has failed to act, the "hammer" falls and a regulatory
result prescribed by the statute automatically goes into effect. See Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note
242, manuscript at 38-39 (describing use of "hammers" in environmental statutes).
322. See id., manuscript at 41 (hammers allow agencies to correct Congressional decisions if they
act within the allowable time period).
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1. OSHA and NIOSH
Congress gave NIOSH the function of conducting research relating to
occupational safety and health, including the preparation of criteria docu-
ments that describe safe levels of exposure to workplace hazards and the
implementation of educational and training programs. 2 Congress appar-
ently located it in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW), which became HHS, because it replaced the Bureau of Occupa-
tional Health and Safety, which was already in HEW. 24 NIOSH is pres-
ently located in Atlanta, Georgia.
NIOSH's location within HHS gives it certain advantages in carrying
out its functions. Its placement enhances coordination with other HHS
agencies, such as the National Toxicology Program, the Center for Dis-
ease Control, and the National Institutes of Health. 2 ' Moreover,
NIOSH's location in HHS may assist in the recruitment and retention of
health scientists, who may consider HHS a particularly congenial institu-
tional home. 26
At the same time, NIOSH and OSHA have significant coordination
problems. 27 First, OSHA does not have a sufficient number of health
professionals to review NIOSH research in-depth. As a result, OSHA
employees find that "OSHA-NIOSH relations are 'close to non-existent
at the working level.' "828 Second, no single administrator is in a position
to resolve disputes between the two organizations. The Secretary of Labor
has no authority over NIOSH and the Secretary of HHS has no authority
over OSHA. Coordination, therefore, requires either agreement between
the two agencies or the intervention of both Secretaries. Since NIOSH
and OSHA rarely elevate disputes to that level, the two agencies coexist in
an uneasy, and sometimes unproductive, relationship.
If Congress were to transfer NIOSH to the Department of Labor, the
Secretary of Labor would be in a position to reconcile the goals and pri-
323. 29 U.S.C. §§ 669-71 (1982).
324. S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5196-97. The idea to establish NIOSH originated in the Senate after the House had passed the
Occupational Safety and Health Act. The House agreed to the Senate's provisions in the conference
committee. CONF. REP. No. 1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5228.
325. See Oversight Hearings on the Occupational Safety and Health Act Before the Subcomm. on
Manpower, Compensation, and Health and Safety of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
Part 2, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 267 (1976) (testimony of Dr. John Finklea, Director, NIOSH)
(NIOSH has available to it the resources of HHS agencies such as Center for Disease Control).
326. T. GREENWOOD, supra note 38, at 116.
327. See id. at 118 ("The lesson appears to be that such complete orghnization separation of
functions [between OSHA and NIOSH] is counterproductive."); Rothstein, supra note 192, at 653
("Both NIOSH and OSHA officials indicated disapproval of the priorities and policies of the other
agency.").
328. See Rothstein, supra note 192, at 653 (citing interviews of OSHA and NIOSH employees).
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orities of the two agencies and coordinate NIOSH research efforts with
OSHA's priority-setting process.32 9 A change in location would also help
eliminate duplicative activities. NIOSH publications are widely distrib-
uted and serve as an important source of reference on occupational
hazards and controls,88 0 but OSHA officials do not consider them ade-
quate for standard-setting purposes.3"' OSHA also engages in training
and education and it should expand that activity. 3 2 If OSHA and NI-
OSH had a closer working relationship, NIOSH could take the lead in
training and education, and OSHA might be able to conserve resources
for its regulatory activities.
2. OSHA and OSHRC
An even more serious institutional problem is the independent status of
OSHRC. As a political compromise, Congress divided regulatory respon-
sibility between OSHA and OSHRC according to a split-enforcement
arrangement. 33 It assigned OSHA, which is in the DOL, the responsibil-
ity of promulgating health and safety standards and enforcing those stan-
dards through inspections and filing complaints against employers. 3 4
Congress gave OSHRC, an independent commission, the responsibility of
adjudicating such complaints.33 Complaints are adjudicated initially by
an ALJ and can be reviewed by the three-member Commission. 3 '
A recent study for the Administrative Conference of the United States
(ACUS) found that the split-enforcement arrangement creates unneces-
329. See T. GREENWOOD, supra note 38, at 123 ("Research whose budget and priorities are set
independently of the agenda and needs of its client regulatory program can tend toward unresponsive-
ness and even irrelevance from the perspective of the regulators."). OSHA employees could seek
advice from NIOSH scientists when health and safety rules were being planned. Although such con-
sultation is also possible under the current institutional arrangement, it would be more likely to occur
if NIOSH were located in the same city and building as OSHA.
330. PREVENTING INJURY, supra note 161, at 270.
331. According to one Director of OSHA's health standards directorate, Congress may have origi-
nally envisioned that OSHA could "tear the title page off" a NIOSH criteria document and publish a
standard based on the criteria document alone, but OSHA staffers have never believed that this tactic
could survive judicial review. Criteria documents are simply not written with litigation in mind.
Wrenn interview, supra note 38.
332. See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION,
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH FOR
CALENDAR YEAR 1987, at 63-74 (1988) (description of OSHA education and training programs).
333. When Congress was debating the creation of OSHA, employers opposed the traditional
arrangement that would have placed the rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicatory functions in
OSHA. Johnson, The Split-Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions from the OSHA and MSHA Ex-
perience, in ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 297 (1986).
Industry objected that it would be impossible to achieve even-handed justice if the OSHA administra-
tor supervised all three activities, and Congress adopted the split-enforcement model as a compromise.
Id. at 297-98. M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 153, § 341.
334. 29 U.S.C. §§ 655(b), 657-69 (1982).
335. 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1982).
336. 29 U.S.C. § 661(j)(1) (1982).
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sary conflicts because Congress failed to specify which agency should pre-
vail when disagreements arise.""7 As a result, ACUS recommended that
whenever Congress establishes a split-enforcement arrangement, it should
clarify which agency has programmatic responsibility and then direct the
courts to give deference to that agency. 38 The ACUS recommendation,
however, does not go far enough because the existing confusion extends
beyond the interpretation of standards. The courts are also split over
which agency should receive deference concerning interpretation of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act itself33 9 and which agency should
control various procedural aspects of enforcement proceedings.3 40
Another important source of friction concerns whether OSHRC should
determine health and safety policy for cases that OSHA brings under the
general duty clause.34 The general duty clause of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act provides that each employer must provide a workplace
"free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause seri-
ous physical harm to employees." 4" A recent case amply illustrates this
problem. In Kastalon, Inc.,348 OSHRC reviewed OSHA's citation of two
337. Johnson, supra note 333, at 318. Some courts have held that OSHA's interpretation of its
own health and safety standards should receive deference, e.g., Brock v. Schwarz-Jordan, Inc., 777
F.2d 195, 197 (5th Cir. 1985) (OSHA's interpretation of term "more than 10 feet above the ground
floor" in safety standard given deference); Donovan v. Amorello & Sons, Inc., 761 F.2d 61, 65 (1st
Cir. 1985) (OSHA's interpretation of term "obstructed view" in safety standard given deference).
Others have deferred to OSHRC's interpretation, e.g., Brock v. Bechtel, 803 F.2d 999, 1000 (9th Cir.
1986) (OSHRC gets deference to determine if barricade regulation was intended to restrain or merely
to warn employees). Still others have held that neither agency should prevail, e.g., Donovan v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 666 F.2d 315, 325-26 (8th Cir. 1981) (where OSHA and OSHRC have no
consistent interpretation concerning meaning of "platform" in safety standard, court need not defer to
OHSRC, but may look to language, purpose, and history of act to resolve issue). Both the courts that
defer to OSHA, and those that do not, claim support in the relevant legislative history. They also
disagree over whether OSHRC has the expertise to interpret standards and otherwise establish policy.
Compare Brock v. Schwarz-Jordan, Inc., 777 F.2d 195, 197 (5th Cir. 1985); Donovan v. A. Amorello
& Sons, Inc., 761 F.2d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 1985) with Marshall v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 577 F.2d 126,
130 (10th Cir. 1978) and Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255, 1262 (4th Cir. 1974).
338. More specifically, ACUS recommended that in adjudicatory challenges to standards promul-
gated pursuant to rulemaking, the adjudicatory agency should give deference to the rulemaking
agency's interpretation of the standard, unless it can be shown that the rulemaking agency's interpre-
tation is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-4 (1987).
339. See, e.g., Marshall v. Sun Petroleum Prods. Co., 622 F.2d 1176, 1184 (3d Cir. 1980)
(OSHRC has no active party status in circuit court and no rulemaking or policy role in administering
act); Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255, 1262 (4th Cir. 1974) (Commission's definition
of term "employer" under § 5(a) given deference).
340. See, e.g., Donovan v. OSHRC, 713 F.2d 918, 930 (2d Cir. 1983) (OSHRC cannot review
settlement by Secretary because it has no direct policy making function); Donovan v. United Transp.
Union, 748 F.2d 340, 346 (6th Cir. 1984) (OSHRC's interpretation of union's right to intervene after
Secretary withdraws citation not overturned if reasonable and consistent with Act); UAW v. OSHRC,
557 F.2d 607, 611 (7th Cir. 1977) (Commission gets deference regarding decision to grant time exten-
sion for compliance with noise standard even though OSHA opposed extension).
341. See Sullivan, Independent Adjudication and Occupational Safety and Health Policy: A Test
For Administrative Court Theory, 31 ADMIN. L. REV. 177, 183-194 (1979).
342. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1982).
343. 1986-87 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 27,643, at 35,970 (July 23, 1986).
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employers for a violation of the general duty clause for exposing employ-
ees to 4,4'-Methylene bis (2 chloronaniline), which is commonly called
MOCA. Although expert witnesses for both OSHA and the companies
agreed that MOCA was a suspected carcinogen,344 the Commission dis-
missed the citations because OSHA had failed to prove that MOCA posed
a "significant risk."34 According to the Commission, OSHA failed to
carry its burden of proof because it lacked any human studies proving that
MOCA is a carcinogen and because its attempt to extrapolate the risk to
humans from animal studies' of the chemical contained unrealiable
assumptions.""
The Commission's decision establishes a higher burden of proof for
OSHA than the Supreme Court's Benzene opinion, which ordered courts
to give OSHA deference concerning its risk assessments. 4" According to
the Court, OSHA is not required to prove significant risk with "anything
approaching scientific certainty" and it can use "conservative assump-
tions" in interpreting data, "risking error on the side of overprotection
rather than underprotection. '"848 The Commission did exactly what the
Court prohibited. It required OSHA to prove significant risk with some-
thing approaching scientific certainty and it objected to the fact that
OSHA's expert witness made conservative assumptions which risked error
on the side of overprotection rather than underprotection. 34 9
Kastalon, Inc. is inconsistent both with the preventive purposes of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act and with the Benzene decision. The
case also demonstrates how the split-enforcement model hobbles OSHA's
authority. It has spawned countless disagreements between OSHA and
OSHRC, requiring OSHA to spend its limited resources constantly liti-
gating to preserve the policies it would like to establish. Additionally,
344. Id. at 35,974.
345. Id. at 35,975.
346. OSHA's expert witness had performed a quantitative risk assessment of MOCA by extrapo-
lating the risk to humans from a dog study in which all six animals given MOCA had died from
cancer. The witness assumed that MOCA posed the same risk to humans as dogs and that MOCA
and benzidine, another carcinogen, had similar effects on humans. Id. at 35,978. The Commission
rejected this evidence because the employer's expert disagreed with the validity of those assumptions
and because he believed that quantitative risk assessments could not be made from animal studies with
any reasonable degree of scientific certainty. Id. at 35,978-79.
347. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 652-53 (OSHA must have quantitative evidence of risk, but if Agency
has evidence, its interpretation of scientific data entitled to deference).
348. 448 U.S. at 656.
349. The Commission also claimed that OSHA had in effect admitted that extrapolations from
animals to measure human risk were unreliable when it explained the difficulties of such extrapola-
tions in its cancer policy. 1986-87 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 27,643, at 35,979. OSHA, however, con-
cluded that since the exact danger to workers was difficult to compute from animal data, the prudent
course was to reduce significant risks to the extent feasible. OSHRC, by comparison, concluded that
nothing should be done to protect workers.
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these disagreements have subjected employers and employees to endless
confusion concerning their respective rights and liabilities.
Congress could avoid the split-enforcement model's problems in two
ways. First, it could restrict OSHRC's function to fact-finding. Congress
could allow OSHRC to find facts in individual cases de novo and subject
its fact-finding function to substantial evidence review. As to policy and
legal decisions, Congress could require OSRHC to give OSHA deference,
leaving to the reviewing court the determination whether OSHA's policy
and legal conclusions were arbitrary or 'capricious, or otherwise not in
accordance with law. Second, Congress could move enforcement authority
into the DOL. An ALJ would hear enforcement actions and write an
initial decision. The decision would be final unless the Assistant Secretary
chose to review the case. The first option would have the benefit of fact-
finding by an independent agency, but maintaining OSHRC solely for
that purpose is unnecessary. Fairness can be adequately guaranteed under
the traditional model. Moreover, Congress could specifically require
OSHA to separate its functions to guarantee fairness and to create inter-
nal barriers to insulate employees who worked on the adjudication of cita-
tions from those who investigated and prosecuted those citations. In addi-
tion, Congress could extend the prohibitions on ex parte contacts now in
the APA to include the Assistant Secretary of Labor for OSHA.85 This
would guarantee the independence of the ALJ.
OSHRC is the creature of a failed experiment with the split-
enforcement model. Whatever slight degree of additional fairness it pro-
vides to employers is more than offset by the disabling effect that indepen-
dent review of legal and policy questions by an Agency not competent to
address those questions has on OSHA's implementation of its statutory
mission. OSHRC should be abolished, and its functions incorporated into
OSHA.
Conclusion
After seventeen years, OSHA is a long way from achieving its statutory
obligation to provide a safe and healthful place of employment for every
worker. OSHA started ambitiously in 1971 when it adopted hundreds of
safety and health standards issued by private standard-setting organiza-
tions as its own regulations. Since then, the Agency's limited ability to
update and supplement these standards has left millions of workers in
danger of being killed or injured on the job.
350. See R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 33, § 9.3.6 (proposal to prohibit
Agency administrators from conferring with ALJs).
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OSHA is partly at fault for its limited productivity. It has done little to
address the many constraints that slow its regulatory progress. OSHA
continues to proceed ahead largely oblivious to the fact that many of the
constraints that slow its regulatory progress are reducing its productivity
to one or two regulations per year. Yet OSHA is not powerless to address
these constraints. It can direct its limited resources toward the worst
health and safety problems. However, this action requires a priority-
setting process, and OSHA does not have one. OSHA can also maximize
the potential of each regulation and seek to increase the number of such
regulations. However, these steps require a regulatory planning process,
which OSHA lacks.
Congress must bear considerable responsibility for OSHA's ineffective-
ness. The regulatory framework created by the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, especially the placement of NIOSH in a separate executive
department and the creation of a separate agency, OSHRC, to adjudicate
violations of the Act, is responsible for several of the Agency's woes. Al-
though the various hurdles to OSHA's productivity have become obvious,
Congress has remained largely inattentive and has done nothing to assist
the Agency to overcome them. In similar circumstances, Congress acted in
the late 1970s to make it easier for EPA to clean up the country's air and
water. The time has come for Congress to make similar adjustments on
behalf of OSHA. Congress should adopt a more flexible regulatory man-
date, clarify the scope of judicial review of OSHA rules, establish appro-
priate statutory deadlines, fold NIOSH into the DOL, and transfer
OSHRC's adjudicatory functions to OSHA.
When Congress created OSHA, it adopted the worthy goal of protect-
ing every American worker from dangerous and disabling workplace con-
ditions. This noble aspiration, however, can be attained only if the lessons
of the last seventeen years become the impetus for OSHA to reform itself
and for Congress to reform OSHA. These reforms will not, of course,
instantly transform OSHA from an overworked agency struggling with a
nearly impossible task to a paragon of administrative efficiency, but they
should send OSHA on its way toward effective implementation of its stat-
utory responsibilities.

